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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
In traditional machine scheduling problems, a central decision maker, provided with
all the relevant information about a system, is asked to derive an allocation scheme
that optimizes some global objective, while simultaneously satisfying all the side
constraints of the problem. However, since the emergence of the Internet as a
computation platform, the assumption of information completeness does not hold
anymore and algorithm designers are encouraged to reconsider the problem from
a decentralized perspective. Most importantly, when decisions are made by inde-
pendent agents, it is more likely that a rational agent will implement the strategy
in such a way that maximizes their own interests, regardless of the overall system
performance. Such situations require algorithm designers to not only focus on the
global performance of the system, but also to take into account the strategic be-
haviour of the individuals involved.
Algorithmic Mechanism Design (AMD), a term coined by Nisan and Ronen (1999),
specifically targets this kind of problem, where part of the input is under the control
of selfish agents who do not have an incentive to tell the truth, unless truth-telling
is for their own good. This type of design endeavours to merge the challenges from
two classic disciplines: algorithm design in computer science, and mechanism design
in game theory. The former emphasizes the importance of the computational effi-
ciency of an algorithm, while ignoring the elements related to incentives; the latter,
instead, normally yields game theoretic outcomes with poor computations. AMD,
on the other hand, aims to present good game theoretic properties and good com-
putational properties at the same time. Guided by the idea of AMD, research has
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been conducted on scheduling problems with various models and various objectives.
Among them, some of the most popular objectives include the minimization of the
maximum completion time (also known as the makespan), and the maximization of
the minimum completion time (also known as the cover). Minimizing the makespan
is naturally related to efficiency, as it ensures that the entire job set is completed
within the shortest possible time; maximizing cover, instead, embodies the concept
of fairness from the machine owner’s perspective in the sense that a machine will
not get exemption due to its slowness. However, it can be argued that the fairness
embodied by both objectives is only to a limited extent as they both can lead to
extreme situations.
Fairness is an important social concept that has not been well considered in the
literature of AMD. This is surprising given that “each person possesses an invio-
lability founded on justice that even the welfare of the society as a whole cannot
override” (Rawls, 2009, pg.3). To concretely state the importance of fairness in the
scheduling context, let us consider the problem faced by the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration. Billions of monetary losses are incurred as a result of unpredictable
system delays each year. To improve this situation, proposals have been raised by
scholars which have guaranteed more efficient schedules and claimed greater savings
in costs. Unfortunately, few of those proposals have been implemented in practice,
mainly because they fail to take the issue of fairness into consideration (Bertsimas
and Patterson, 2000).
Fairness plays a key role in resource allocation, especially in socially oriented ar-
eas, including education, medical systems, and businesses. Although it is in the
interest of the central authority to achieve system efficiency when allocating re-
sources, individual players tend to care more about their own interests. If they
cannot maximize their own benefits, then they at least want to be treated fairly. As
a special case of resource allocation, machine scheduling problems also face similar
challenges deriving from the players’ desire for fairness. To achieve higher levels
of fairness, we propose a new objective called minimizing the maximum deviation,
which aims to minimize the maximum deviation between the completion time of
each individual machine and the average completion time of the system, calculated
as the sum of all the job sizes divided by the sum of all the machine speeds. To the
best of our knowledge, this objective has not been considered by others before.
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1.2 Literature review
1.2.1 Fairness
Considered to be cornerstones of a healthy society, the notions of equity, justice
and fairness have been extensively studied from both a qualitative social analysis
and a quantitative mathematical perspective. The fair treatment of individual so-
cial units is regarded as an important organizational goal within a wide variety of
settings, including education, health care, business and government. However, it is
not easy to quantify the notion of fairness in the absence of a proper standard and
feasible framework. Also, due to the numerous existing interpretations of the term
fairness, together with the differences in the nature of resource allocation problems,
a universally agreed-upon definition of this notion is still lacking. Nevertheless, the
literature presents a number of general theories of fairness which provide the basis
to develop the majority of fairness schemes.
The oldest and probably one of the most famous theories of justice is represented
by Aristotle’s equity principle (Rowe and Broadie, 2002). Sometimes cited as the
desert theory, Aristotle’s rule of distributive justice states that goods should be ap-
portioned in proportion to each claimant’s contribution. Although this idea seems
reasonable, critics of the theory argue that in order for the theory to be applicable,
there must be a way to measure each claimant’s contribution on a cardinal scale
and that the resources must be arbitrarily divisible. Another prominent theory is
developed from the classical utilitarianism, which assumes that an economic man
balances his losses against his gains in order to fulfill his own interests. From the
utilitarian view, a justice distribution is to achieve the maximum utilities of the
sum, regardless how this sum of utilities is distributed among individuals. The
principle has been widely examined in the area of welfare economics in the 19th cen-
tury. However, the clear absence of fairness and lack of a standard measurement for
utility make it controversial. A third approach proposed by Rawls (2009) is based
on a central principle, according to which the highest minimum utility level of each
player needs to be guaranteed. In other words, this principle aims to ensure that
the least well-off group in society becomes as well off as possible. A refined version
of this principle is given by the lexicographic Rawlsian maximin rule. It follows
the Rawlsian max-min fairness, but if the worst off players in two distributions are
equally well off, the principles compare the utilities of the second worse off person
in each distribution, and so on, until a difference shows, then the principles select
the one that maximizes the utility of that player. Finally, Nash developed the Nash
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standard of comparison, which measures the percentage change of the claimants’
utilities when a small amount of resources is transferred between two claimants.
Such a transfer is only justified when the gainer’s utility increases by a larger pro-
portion than the decrease in the losers’ utility. For more detailed information on
these theories, we refer readers to Young (1995) and Sen (1973).
We define deviation as the absolute difference between the completion time of a
machine and the average completion time of the system. The aim to minimize the
maximum deviation among the machines embodies the concept of max-min fairness,
as well as its dual definition, min-max fairness. Developed from Rawlsian justice,
max-min fairness is among the oldest and most widely applied fairness criteria.
Initially discussed in the domain of communication networks (Megiddo, 1974), max-
min fairness saw its application in window flow control protocols (Hahne, 1991),
before becoming very popular in both wired and wireless networks (Charny, 1994;
Ma and Steenkiste, 1997; Roborts, 1994; Nandapogal et al., 2000; Sarkar and Tassi-
ulas, 2000; Huang and Bensaou, 2001; Sridharan and Krishnamachari, 2004). More
specifically, max-min fairness was first studied in single-source fractional flow net-
works. However, later Kleinberg et al. (1999) raised the idea of unsplittable flows
and showed that when restricted by unsplittable flows, the original problem becomes
NP-complete. Their work highlighted the computational difficulty of deciding a
max-min fair allocation. A direct result of their conclusions is a shift in research
focus from exact algorithms to approximation algorithms with strong guarantees
(Kumar and Kleinberg, 2000; Afek et al., 1996; Goel et al., 2000).
Definitions of max-min fairness have been described in slightly different ways in
different problem settings. Nevertheless, the logic remains unchanged. An allo-
cation is max-min fair if an increase in the utility of one individual can only be
achieved by reducing the utility of other individuals whose utility is already smaller.
In a max-min fair schedule, no one is able to further increase its utility because the
objective is in favour of the worse off individuals. Among all works in this field, stud-
ies of max-min fair allocation of indivisible goods are the most related to this thesis.
Also known as the Santa Claus problem, the max-min fair allocation problem was
considered in the scheduling context by Beza´kova´ and Dani (2005), whose round-
ing Assignment-LP was later improved by a stronger linear programming relaxation
called Configuration-LP (Bansal and Sviridenko, 2006). An alternative rounding
approach was initiated by Asadpour et al. (2008). Focusing on the restricted ver-
sion of the problem, they prove that the integrality gap of the Configuration-LP is
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at most 4 from a hypergraph matchings perspective. Inspired by their local search
procedure, the most recent work from Annamalai et al. (2017) proposes a purely
combinatorial algorithm which further improves the approximation guarantee.
The main problem of the max-min fair criterion is that its corresponding alloca-
tion is not necessarily Pareto optimal. In other words, it is possible to increase the
utility of one individual without decreasing that of others in a max-min fair allo-
cation (Massoulie´, 2007). However, this can be solved by introducing the notion
of leximin ordering, the formal definition of which will be introduced in the next
chapter. It has been proved that the leximin social welfare optimum always yields
Pareto optimality (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). The biggest criticism about max-min
fairness and its lexicographical version is that it only concentrates on the worst off
individual (or the kth worst off under the lexicographical max-min) while ignoring
the rest.
By comparison, min-max fairness receives much less attention in network studies.
It has been shown that in general there is a fairness gap between the performance
achieved under min-max fairness and under max-min fairness (Boche et al., 2007).
Earlier work conducted by Deuermeyer et al. (1982) also suggests that the study of a
scheduling problem under the min-max objective function is not simply determined
by the dual form of the max-min function. Boche et al. (2007) also character-
ize a subclass of networks in which max-min fairness and min-max fairness can be
achieved simultaneously.
A natural concern over the issue of fairness is whether or not the achievement of
fairness is incompatible with global utility optimality. The conjecture that a fairer
allocation is also less efficient has been prompted by massive examples in the re-
source allocation literature, ranging from wired networks (Mo and Walrand, 2000;
Bonald and Massoulie´, 2001) and wireless networks (Luo et al., 2004; Srinivasan
and Somani, 2003) to economics (Bulter and Williams, 2002). These studies seem
to conclude that fairness equals inefficiency. The work by Tang et al. (2004), nev-
ertheless, suggests the opposite. By investigating the exact characteristics of the
trade-off between fairness and throughput in general networks, they produce a set
of counter examples where a fairer allocation is revealed to be always more efficient.
Their work has not only changed the stereotype of the inherent conflict between
fairness and efficiency, but it has also encouraged efforts towards generating algo-
rithms that guarantee the coexistence of the two seemingly conflicting objectives.
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The trade-off between fairness and efficiency has been widely discussed in air traf-
fic management (Bertsimas and Patterson, 2000; Ball et al., 2007; Ball and Lulli,
2004; Barnhart et al., 2012), medical settings (Williams, 1985; Su and Zenios, 2006;
Bisias et al., 2012), and call center designs (de Ve´ricourt and Zhou, 2005; Luh and
Viniotis, 2002; Bonald et al, 2006). However, this trade-off is only discussed from a
soft qualitative perspective. It is not until the introduction of the concept of price
of fairness (Bertsimas et al., 2011) that the trade-off between fairness and efficiency
can be truly quantified.
More specifically, Bertsimas et al. (2011) describe a canonical resource allocation
problem as a problem involving n players and a central decision maker, who assigns
scarce resources among the players. Each player defines a utility function based on
their own preference, and the final utility they derive depends on this utility func-
tion, as well as on the allocation chosen by the central decision maker. By using
the classical utilitarian principle, Bertsimas et al. (2011) define a fully efficient al-
location as an allocation that maximizes the sum of the utilities of all players. The
price of fairness can then be defined as the relative performance loss under a ‘fair’
allocation compared to the above fully efficient allocation.
1.2.2 Mechanism design
Retrospectively, the problem of resource allocation has been discussed under com-
plete information settings, where players behave in line with the instructions received
from a central authority (Ramakrishnan et al., 1987; Afek et al., 1996). With the
emergence of diverse and decentralized computing environments, researchers have
gradually realized that it is not always reasonable to assume a universal implemen-
tation of any given algorithm. In a decentralized setting, decisions and actions are
taken by selfish agents with conflicting preferences that need to be aggregated to
form one socially desirable outcome. Such mechanisms for preference aggregation
include, but are not limited to, auctions, divorce settlement procedures, voting pro-
tocols, and collaborative ratings.
Lack of control from a central authority creates the opportunity for individual agents
to manipulate the system by misreporting their preferences if, by doing so, they can
mislead the mechanism to choose an outcome that is more favourable to the agent
than the outcome that would have been selected otherwise. Manipulability is a
pervasive problem in mechanism design which is undesirable given that insincere in-
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formation can result in an undesirable overall social outcome. To solve the problem
of manipulability, early efforts were focused on social choice functions. Unfortu-
nately, with regard to this problem, negative results were successively achieved both
by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) independently. Their theorem states
that under any nondictatorial preference aggregation scheme, if there are at least
three possible outcomes, then an agent is better off by reporting strategically un-
der some preferences. Consequently, the theorem rules out all hope of designing a
truthfully implementable social choice function without any external incentives.
Mechanism design aims at avoiding this negative result by introducing various mod-
ifications of the model. One of the successful modifications to this end is given by
monetary compensation. Nevertheless, when in some social settings money transfer
is deemed to be undesirable, an alternative approach with important breakthroughs
is determined by modifying the assumption of unrestricted preference domains. The
most famous positive result of this type is represented by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanisms, which aim at optimizing (weighted) social welfare. It has been
shown that if the valuation space has full dimensionality, or unrestricted domains,
the VCG mechanism is the only class that can be truthfully implemented. In ad-
dition, as long as the target function maximizes the sum of all the agents’ utilities,
VCG presents no restrictions on the valuation functions of the agents.
Based on the main concern of the design, traditional mechanism designs fall into two
different strands. One is represented by optimality, which maximizes the expected
revenue of the seller. The other is given by efficiency, which pursues social efficiency
instead of revenue maximization. In the following sections, a well-known application
and the corresponding results for each type are briefly presented.
Auctions
A seller can serve exactly one of the many bidders, each of whom has a private val-
uation for the same item. The seller’s aim is to maximize the gain from selling the
item. The most famous result in auction theory is given by Vickrey’s second price
auction (1961). The mechanism states that whoever offers the highest valuation for
the request pays the second highest price offered. Applications of mechanism designs
to auction theory are among the richest (Myerson, 1981; Che and Gale, 1996). We
refer the readers to Klemperer (1999) for a comprehensive review on early studies.
The emergence of cloud computing and electronic markets has triggered a renewed
surge of studies in the field (Lin et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2016).
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Public Projects
The problem of public projects relates to how much each user, who commonly ben-
efits from the upgrade of some public facilities, is charged if such a decision is made.
The solution to this problem is known as the Clarke tax (1971), which states that
once an upgrade decision is made, each user pays the portion of their bid that makes
a difference to the outcome. This solves the so-called free rider problem which was
considered to be unsolvable prior to the introduction of Clarke tax.
The mechanism considered in this thesis falls under the umbrella of the direct reve-
lation model, where the only action an agent needs to take is to report its type (Gui
et al., 2004; Lavi et al., 2003; Saks and Yu, 2005). Among all the models falling
into this type, machine scheduling was popularized thanks to the work by Nisan and
Ronen (1999).
Just like in the scheduling models under complete information, the makespan mini-
mization function is the objective which has been the most commonly studied in the
field of AMD. Unfortunately, this objective does not take the classical utilitarian
form; as a result, VCG cannot be applied. Nisan and Ronen (1999) focus on the
truthful mechanisms in machine scheduling with unrelated machine agents. They
conclude that there is no truthful mechanism that minimizes the makespan in this
setting. Archer and Tardos (2001) examine a similar model for related machine
scheduling. This time, however, a necessary and sufficient condition is derived for
an allocation algorithm to be truthfully implementable. The condition, which we
will introduce in detail in the following chapter, acts as a theoretical basis for the
majority of, if not all, the design mechanisms of this type, including the studies in
this thesis. Furthermore, Archer and Tardos (2001) show that the optimal fractional
solution qualifies the truthful condition, but only in expectation, if the partial jobs
are allocated randomly between the two machines they assigned to. This is the first
positive result in AMD studies, even though the algorithm embodies a weaker notion
of truthfulness, in the sense that agents maximize their expected, rather than their
actual utilities. By rounding the speed of the machines, Andelman et al. (2005)
provide the first deterministic truthful mechanism, which achieves 5-approximation.
Using a similar rounding technique, Kova´cs (2005) improves the approximation ra-
tio to 3 on the basis of the well-known greedy algorithm – Longest Processing Time
(LPT). Auletta et al. (2004) provide an alternative approach to combine optimality
and truthfulness. The approach assigns jobs in two batches: the first batch contains
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a limited number of big jobs which are assigned by an exact truthful algorithm; the
second batch contains the rest of the jobs, which are assigned by a greedy truthful
algorithm. Their approach yields a family of deterministic polynomial-time truthful
(4 + ε)-approximation mechanisms for any fixed number of machines. The problem
of minimizing the maximum completion time is solved by proving the existence of
the truthful polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) in both the randomized
and the deterministic settings, as in Dhangwatnotai et al. (2011) and Christodoulou
and Kova´cs (2013), respectively.
Following a natural shift from the makespan minimization problem, researchers
started to target other objective functions, and unsurprisingly, cover maximization
was the one which attracted their attention. The cover maximization problem was
first touched upon by Epstein and van Stee (2010). They propose a new technique
which reduces the number of jobs while remaining close to the optimal solution
at the same time. The monotone PTAS of their work is linear in the number of
jobs. Christodoulou et al. (2010) provide an approximation guarantee of 2 + ε,
which is a significant improvement from Epstein and van Stee’s upper bound of
min{m, (2 + ε)sm/s1}. Finally, Epstein et al. (2013) claim that a wide class of
scheduling problems (including makespan minimization, cover maximization, and
minimizing the `p-norm of the machine workloads vector) can be addressed by means
of a unified framework that outputs deterministic monotone PTAS for uniformly re-
lated machines.
It is noticeable that in a strategic scheduling model, apart from machine agents,
we can also assume to have job agents, as in the model described by Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou (1999). One fundamental assumption of such research is that
part of the job set is unknown and will only be revealed over time. Porter (2004)
studies the truthful mechanism for online scheduling with job agents on a single
machine. Heydenreich et al. (2010) look at the problem with m parallel machines.
Due to the focus of our research, however, we will not investigate this branch of
studies deeply.
1.2.3 Machine scheduling
Scheduling resources and tasks to processors is a decision that is made regularly in
both the manufacturing and the service industries. For example, in the context of
airports, each arriving and departing plane needs to be assigned to one of the gates;
while in schools, teaching facilities such as classrooms and projectors need to be
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assigned at the beginning of each term according to the curricula. In this thesis, job
is used to represent any form of resource or task await for allocation, while machine
refers to a processor in general.
Both jobs and machines can present different characteristics, and the combination
of these different characteristics leads to different machine scheduling models. For
example, machines might be identical or operate at different speeds; the processing
of jobs might require single or multiple resources; or there might be precedence con-
straints between jobs. We refer readers to Chen et al. (1998) for a nicely presented
review on machine scheduling. To the best of our knowledge, the application of
game theory is only limited to a few machine scheduling models. Moreover, a truth-
ful mechanism does not exist in the strategic version of makespan minimization for
scheduling with unrelated machines (Nisan and Ronen, 1999). This thesis focuses
on the assignment of off-line jobs to uniform parallel machines without preemption.
More specifically, machines are considered as identical except that each machine
processes jobs at a different speed. All the jobs and their associated features are
fully released before an allocation decision is made. Once a machine starts to pro-
cess a job, it cannot process another job unless it finishes first the job at hand. In
other words, a schedule is only feasible if each job is assigned to one machine, and
each machine processes one job at a time without any interruptions.
1.3 Contributions and thesis structure
This work emphasizes the importance of fairness in machine scheduling problems
by proposing a new objective function. The goal of the deviation minimization ob-
jective is to achieve more evenly distributed workloads among machines by ensuring
that each machine’s completion time is not too far away from the average comple-
tion time. The model is formally presented in the following chapter, together with
the basic concepts, notations, and fundamental theories.
In Chapter 3, we examine the performance of the existing approximation algorithms.
We found that a truthful α-approximation algorithm for the makespan minimization
problem can be directly applied to the new objective. The algorithm will remain
α-approximate for the deviation minimization problem if α ≥ 2, and will become
2-approximate if α < 2. The second part of the chapter focuses on LPT* – a fast
3-approximation algorithm proposed by Kova´cs (2005). A tighter bound for LPT*
of 2.8 is found.
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Chapter 4 considers the exact algorithm for the new objective. We show that the
problem cannot be truthfully implemented with any exact algorithm. As a result,
the existing approaches for generating a truthful PTAS are not applicable to the
deviation minimization problem. We propose an alternative tie breaking rule which
successfully narrows down the type of instances where truthfulness is not guaran-
teed. Computational results imply that if the central authority requires the agents
to report their speeds in a rounding format, our proposed algorithm becomes truth-
ful.
Chapter 5 takes an alternative view and discusses the issue of fairness among jobs
with due dates. The traditional maximum tardiness minimization objective is em-
ployed for this purpose. Due to the lack of connection between job sizes and job
due dates, the tardiness objective cannot be truthfully implemented with an ex-
act algorithm either. From the observation that the only difference between the
longest processing time and the earliest due date is the job sequence, we propose
the two-stage LPT*, which remains the truthful feature of LPT*, and produces a
much improved performance in minimizing the maximum tardiness.
Finally, the final remarks and the conclusion of the thesis are presented in Chapter
6.
11
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter we formally present our model and the objective function. We
define the basic notation used throughout the thesis under both the scheduling
and the game theoretic contexts respectively, as well as the mathematical form of
the deviation minimization objective. A tailored approximation ratio to measure
algorithm performance is introduced followed by examples that compare the new
objective function with the existing ones.
2.1 Basic concepts and notations
2.1.1 Scheduling model
We consider machine scheduling problems with the following characteristics. There
is a set of jobs J = {J1, . . . , Jn}, and each job must be assigned to one and only
one machine from a set of machines M = {M1, . . . ,Mm} with no preemption. Job
Jj is associated with a size of pj > 0, machine Mi is characterized by speed si > 0,
and the processing time of Jj on Mi equals pj/si. For simplicity, we sometimes
refer Jj to its job length pj . An allocation of jobs to machines is to partition the
jobs into m subsets that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. In a
feasible allocation, denoted by pi, each job must be completely processed without
interruption and no machine can process more than one job at a time. Π denotes
the entire feasible allocations from J to M .
An algorithm A : J → M is defined as a set of rules to be followed in allocat-
ing the entire job set onto machines. Implementing A to an instance I, the sum of
all the processing times being assigned to Mi is called the workload of Mi, denoted
by WAi (I). The completion time of Mi is computed as T
A
i (I) =
WAi (I)
si
. Notation I
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is often omitted for simplicity if doing so causes no confusion. We define cover as the
smallest completion time of instance I under A, denoted by TAmin(I) = mini{TAi (I)},
and makespan as the largest completion time, denoted by TAmax(I) = maxi{TAi (I)}.
We define a fair schedule as an allocation in which each machine finishes its as-
signed workload by the same time length T0, where T0 is known as the average
completion time and is computed as
T0 =
∑
j∈J pj∑
i∈M si
.
It is important to note that such a fair schedule is not always feasible because the
jobs to be assigned are unsplittable.
To generate a feasible schedule that is close enough to the fair schedule, we in-
troduce the concept of deviation. The deviation of Mi under allocation pi is defined
as
devi(pi) = |Ti(pi)− T0|,
and denote by
dev(pi) = max
i
{devi(pi)}
the maximum deviation of pi. Likewise, devA(I) denotes the maximum deviation
from implementing algorithm A to instance I. The deviation minimization objective
function is therefore,
min
pi∈Π
max
i
{devi(pi)}.
Finally, we provide the definitions for the bottleneck machine and lexicographical
comparison respectively as follows.
Definition 2.1 (bottleneck machine). A machine is a bottleneck machine of a sched-
ule if it achieves the optimal value of an objective function.
Definition 2.2 (lexicographical comparison). A vector (v1, . . . , vm) is lexicograph-
ically smaller (bigger) than (v¯1, . . . , v¯m) if, for some l, vl < v¯l (vl > v¯l) and vi = v¯i
for all i < l.
2.1.2 Mechanism design model
In the strategic version of machine scheduling, one crucial element is given by the
interactions between a set of independent agents, which can represent either the
13
set of jobs or the set of machines. This thesis focuses on the machine-agent model,
where each Mi ∈M is controlled by an independent agent i, who considers machine
speed si as its private information, also known as the agent’s type. In the game, the
only action that an agent needs to carry out is to report its speed. Therefore, the
agent’s action is denoted by its reporting speed bi. Beside the private information,
usually there is also public information that is shared across the system, such as the
number of machines or the size of the jobs.
The scheduling decision made by the central authority relies on both the public
information and the actions taken by each agent. Given that the omission of pub-
lic information hardly causes problem of ambiguity, it has been excluded from our
model. The output algorithm, denoted by A(b) ∈ Π, computes a schedule of jobs to
machines based on the agents’ actions, which in turn are influenced by the agents’
types. We define strategy xi as a mapping from agent i’s type space into its action
space, i.e. xi : si → bi. It is important to note that i chooses its strategy without
being told what are the types of the other agents. Let b−i denote the vector of the
reporting speeds of all the other agents, except for i. The entire vector of bids b can
be written as (bi, b−i), which is equivalent to (xi(si), b−i).
Different outcomes are valued differently by an agent. We express this by the valu-
ation of an agent for a certain schedule, which normally depends on the true value
of the agent’s type. Therefore, we denote agent i’s valuation for outcome pi as
vi(pi|si). We assume that an agent always prefers an outcome with a higher value.
Concretely, if schedule pi is preferred over pi′ by agent i, then vi(pi|si) > vi(pi′|si).
Under the scheduling context, it is assumed that a machine incurs a cost in pro-
cessing the workload to which it has been allocated. It is further assumed that the
cost for agent i to process one unit of job length equals the inverse of its actual
speed, i.e., costi =
1
si
. Complying with the assumptions, agents view their work-
loads as a burden; hence they would prefer allocations that assign them with fewer
workloads. Accordingly, agent i’s valuation towards schedule pi is the total costs in
processing its workload under pi, i.e., vi(pi|si) = −Wi(pi)si , which takes negative values.
To improve the overall quality of a schedule, it is common to manipulate agents’
strategies by introducing monetary payments. In machine scheduling context, the
payments are made by the central authority to the agents based on their reporting
speeds in order to induce a desired behaviour. Let ξi(bi, b−i) ∈ R denote the pay-
ment function of agent i. Therefore, the mechanism model, denoted by µ, consists
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of an allocation algorithm A as well as a payment scheme ξ, i.e., µ = (A, ξ). With
no further information on b−i, a strategic agent will act in such a way that the
schedule generated by the output function always maximizes its overall utility no
matter what action is taken by the other agents. Such strategy is known as the
dominant strategy, which presents the following formal definition.
Definition 2.3 (dominant strategy equilibrium). A strategy vector x ∈ X represents
a dominant strategy equilibrium, if for all agents i, for all types si of agent i, for all
actions b−i of the other agents, and all alternative actions bi of agent i, the following
holds:
vi(A(xi(si), b−i)|si)− ξi(xi(si), b−i) ≥ vi(A(bi, b−i)|si)− ξi(bi, b−i).
Based on the dominant strategy equilibrium, the truthful mechanism considered in
this thesis is defined as follows.
Definition 2.4 (truthful and truthfully implementable). A direct revelation mech-
anism is truthful if the strategy vector x in which each agent truthfully reports its
type is a dominant strategy equilibrium, i.e., xi(si) = si. An allocation algorithm A
is said to be truthfully implementable if we can find a payment rule ξ such that the
mechanism µ = (A, ξ) is truthful.
Now let us introduce a necessary and sufficient condition for a truthful mechanism
in the context of related machine scheduling with machine agents.
Theorem 2.1 (Archer and Tardos, 2001). An allocation algorithm is truthfully
implementable if and only if for all agents i and all b−i ∈ Bm−1, where Bm−1
denote the action space of all agents except i, the workload function Wi(bi, b−i) is
an increasing function of bi. If this is the case, then the following payments yield a
truthful mechanism:
ξi(bi, b−i) = hi(b−i) +
1
bi
Wi(bi, b−i)−
∫ bi
0
Wi(u, b−i)du.
Here, hi denote arbitrary functions that are independent of bi.
The theorem says that an allocation algorithm is truthfully implementable if and
only if the workload of an agent does not decrease as its reporting speed increases.
In addition, the theorem specifies the form for the payment functions in a truthful
mechanism. This theorem is the most famous in AMD and serves as the foundation
for many subsequent mechanism designs for related parallel machine scheduling,
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since it neatly separates the problem of designing the allocation algorithm from the
payment scheme.
2.1.3 Approximation algorithms
The problem of scheduling n independent jobs on m uniform machines is known to
be NP-complete (Lenstra et al., 1977). For such problems, it is generally considered
to be unlikely for a polynomial time bounded algorithm to exist. Therefore, a
common practice is to solve an NP-complete or harder problem by means of efficient
heuristic methods in the hope of finding “good” solutions rather than attempting to
find optimal ones. This study focuses on designing approximation algorithms with
provable guarantees on performance.
Definition 2.5 (r-approximation). Let K denote an optimization problem. Let A
be an algorithm such that for any instance I of K, A computes a feasible solution
with cost costA(I). A represents an r-approximation for K if for any instance I of
K
1
r
≤ cost
A(I)
cost∗(I)
≤ r,
where cost∗(I) denotes the optimal value and r ≥ 1.
As for the deviation minimization problem, the objective outputs the maximum
deviation of each machine’s completion time from the average completion time.
According to a direct application of the r-approximation definition, the performance
of algorithm A for the deviation minimization problem is measured by
ρA(I) =
devA(I)
dev∗(I)
; ρA = sup
I
ρA(I).
One problem with the above definition is that, in some instances, jobs can be evenly
distributed among machines so that the fair schedule is realized. If this is the
case, then the optimal deviation dev∗(I) equals zero, and ρA becomes infinity. To
overcome this weakness, we add the average completion time to both the numerator
and the denominator. Therefore, the approximation ratio of A over the deviation
minimization problem is adjusted to
ρA(I) =
devA(I) + T0(I)
dev∗(I) + T0(I)
; ρA = sup
I
ρA(I).
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2.2 Comparing the objective functions
This section clarifies the significance of the new objective function. As mentioned
in the literature review, fairness is a fundamental issue in many resource alloca-
tion problems. When we talk about fair allocations in machine scheduling, more
often than not we refer to the allocation that maximizes the minimum completion
time as studied by Epstein and van Stee (2010). However, we argue that the fair-
ness achieved under the cover maximization objective is limited. We illustrate this
argument with a simple but extreme example.
Example 2.1. Consider an instance of two machines, with speeds s1 = 1 and
s2 = 10. Assign two jobs with the same size of 5 under the three different objectives
respectively and display the corresponding workloads in the table below.
Machine 1 Machine 2
Cover maximization 5 5
Makespan minimization 0 10
Deviation minimization 0 10
Table 2.1: Workloads under different objective functions (p1 = p2 = 5)
In the above example, the schedule that maximizes the cover discriminates the slow
machine in the sense that it takes the slow machine 10 times longer to complete
its allocated workload than the fast machine. As a result, we argue that the other
two objectives, i.e., the makespan minimization and deviation minimization, yield
a fairer solution. Now let us consider another example.
Example 2.2. Consider an instance with the same machines as above. This time
assign two jobs of sizes 1 and 8.9 respectively. The workloads of each machine are
summarized below.
Machine 1 Machine 2
Makespan minimization 0 9.9
Cover maximization 1 8.9
Deviation minimization 1 8.9
Table 2.2: Workloads under different objective functions (p1 = 1, p2 = 8.9)
As shown in the table, in order to decrease the makespan from 1 to 0.99, the slow
machine is left to be slack under the makespan minimization objective, even though
assigning the unit job to it is intuitively a fairer solution.
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The last example shows that although the deviation minimization function is a
simple combination of the makespan minimization and cover maximization func-
tions, the schedule it generates is different from the old objectives.
Example 2.3. Consider an instance with four machines, with speed s1 = 27, s2 =
20, s3 = 17, and s4 = 2. Assign a total number of 7 jobs to these machines under
three objectives, i.e., the makespan minimization, the cover maximization and the
deviation minimization, respectively. Table 2.3 presents the sizes of each job and
their allocations under different objective functions.
The completion time of each machine is presented in the last row of Table 2.3.
Under the deviation minimization function, there is no significant difference in the
machines’ completion times, which implies that all the machines spend a similar
amount of time to complete their assigned workload. However, if jobs are allocated
under the makespan minimization objective, the other three machines will envy M4,
who receives zero workload. Alternatively, if the allocation follows the cover maxi-
mization function, M4 who spends double the time to complete its work, will envy
the other three machines instead. Inarguably, the allocation under the deviation
minimization objective causes the lowest level of envy and therefore is the fairest
among the three.
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Chapter 3
Approximation algorithms
In this chapter, we examine the performance of some selected existing greedy al-
gorithms on the deviation minimization problem from two perspectives: (a) the
distance of the returned solution from the optimal fair schedule and (b) truthfulness
in soliciting private information on speeds. Based on the initial observations, a gen-
eral rule is derived which describes the relation between the deviation minimization
objective and the makespan minimization objective. During this process, we reduce
the bound of an existing algorithm from 3 to 2.8.
3.1 Longest processing time
Due to its advantage in computational efficiency, Longest Processing Time (LPT)
has gained its popularity in machine scheduling studies. The greedy algorithm gives
decent performance for both makespan minimization and cover maximization prob-
lems. Considering the deviation function is a combination of the two, it is a natural
process to examine the performance of LPT on our new objective function.
The algorithm first orders the jobs according to non-increasing job sizes, and every
time it assigns the next job in the ordered list to the machine which finishes earliest
with the jobs assigned to it so far. According to Graham (1969) and Deuermeyer et
al. (1982) respectively, for any instance I with identical machines, we have
TLPTmax (I)
T ∗max(I)
≤ 4
3
− 1
3m
; (3.1)
T ∗min(I)
TLPTmin (I)
≤ 4m− 2
3m− 1 . (3.2)
20
For uniform machines, according to Gonzalez et al. (1977), we have
TLPTmax (I)
T ∗max(I)
< 2.
3.1.1 Bound LPT for identical machines
As a touchstone for the problem, we first consider a simplified version, where all
machines have the same speed. We show that LPT maintains its performance in
this specific case for the deviation function. Notice that when m = 1, the problem
becomes trivial as all jobs have to be allocated to that single machine, resulting in
the same deviation value for any algorithm. Therefore, we only consider m ≥ 2 in
all our proofs.
Proposition 3.1. For scheduling m identical machines, we have ρLPT ≤ 43 − 13m
for the deviation minimization problem.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there is an instance I such that
ρLPT(I) >
4
3
− 1
3m
. (3.3)
By normalizing the job lengths we can assume without loss of generality that
dev∗(I) + T0(I) = 3m, (3.4)
devLPT(I) + T0(I) > 4m− 1. (3.5)
With ρLPT understood as ρLPT(I), we omit I from our notation for simplicity in the
remainder of our proof. According to the definition, we have
T ∗max ≤ dev∗ + T0 = 3m. (3.6)
If devLPT = TLPTmax − T0, then (3.6) implies
ρLPT =
devLPT + T0
dev∗ + T0
≤ T
LPT
max
T ∗max
,
which together with (3.3) contradicts inequality (3.1). Hence we must have
devLPT = T0 − TLPTmin , (3.7)
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which together with (3.5) implies 2T0 − TLPTmin > 4m− 1, or
T0 > 2m− 1
2
+
TLPTmin
2
. (3.8)
According to (3.4), T0 ≤ 3m, which together with (3.8) implies
TLPTmin < 2m+ 1. (3.9)
Now we wish to derive an equation similar to (3.7) with LPT replaced by OPT.
Noticing that T ∗max ≤ 3m from (3.6), with (3.8) we have
T ∗max − T0 ≤ 3m− T0 < m+
1
2
− 1
2
· TLPTmin . (3.10)
On the other hand, combining (3.2) and (3.8) leads to
T0 − T ∗min > 2m−
1
2
+
TLPTmin
2
− 4m− 2
3m− 1 · T
LPT
min
= 2m− 1
2
− 5m− 3
6m− 2 · T
LPT
min . (3.11)
Combining (3.10) and (3.11) gives
(T0−T ∗min)− (T ∗max − T0)
>
(
2m− 1
2
− 5m− 3
6m− 2 · T
LPT
min
)
−
(
m+
1
2
− 1
2
· TLPTmin
)
= m− 1− m− 1
3m− 1 · T
LPT
min
> m− 1− m− 1
3m− 1(2m+ 1) =
(m− 1)(m− 2)
3m− 1 ≥ 0,
where the second inequality is due to (3.9). Therefore, according to the definition we
have dev∗ = T0 − T ∗min as desired. Now this equation together with its counterpart
(3.7) implies that
ρLPT =
devLPT + T0
dev∗ + T0
=
2T0 − TLPTmin
2T0 − T ∗min
,
which together with (3.3) implies
(4m− 1)T ∗min > 3mTLPTmin + 2(m− 1)T0,
in which we replace T ∗min and T0 with their bounds in (3.2) and (3.8) and obtain
TLPTmin > 3m− 1, which is in direct contradiction with (3.9), with which we complete
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our proof of the proposition. 
The following example shows that the bound we derived in Proposition 3.1 is tight.
Example 3.1. Consider an instance with m identical machines, and n = 2m + 1
jobs with processing times defined as
pj =
{
2m− b(j + 1)/2c , j = 1, 2, . . . , 2m
m , j = 2m+ 1
Notice that in this way, jobs are automatically sorted in non-increasing order to
their sizes, thus simplify the implementation of LPT. The average completion time
T0 =
∑2m
j=1 [2m− b(j + 1)/2c] +m
m
= 3m.
Machines M1 M2 M3 M4 · · · Mm
2m− 1 2m− 1 2m− 2 2m− 2 · · · 2m− bm+12 c
Jobs m m m+ 1 m+ 1 · · · 2m− bm+22 c
m
Table 3.1: Allocation of jobs to machines in LPT
As shown in Table 3.1, LPT assigns the first m biggest jobs to machines in increasing
order of machine indices, and the next m biggest jobs in reverse order of machine
indices, followed by the final job being assigned to M1. Clearly, each machine receives
a workload of 3m−1, except for M1 whose workload is 4m−1. Thus, the maximum
deviation
devLPT = max{(4m− 1)− 3m, 3m− (3m− 1)} = m− 1.
Table 3.2 presents the optimal allocation of jobs to machines for this instance. As
can be seen, jobs can be evenly allocated so that each machine has the same processing
time, which indicates dev∗ = 0. Accordingly,
ρLPT =
devLPT + T0
dev∗ + T0
=
4m− 1
3m
.
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Machines M1 M2 M3 M4 · · · Mm
m
Jobs m
2m− 1 2m− 1 2m− 2 · · · 2m− bm2 c
m m+ 1 m+ 1 m+ 2 · · · 2m− bm+12 c
Table 3.2: Allocation of jobs to machines in OPT
3.1.2 Bound LPT for uniform machines
In this section, we extend the previous result to a more general setting, where
machines are allowed to operate at different speeds.
Proposition 3.2. For scheduling m uniform machines, we have ρLPT ≤ 2 for the
deviation minimization problem.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there is an instance I such that
ρLPT(I) =
devLPT(I) + T0(I)
dev∗(I) + T0(I)
> 2
=⇒ devLPT(I)− T0(I) > 2dev∗(I) ≥ 0. (3.12)
If devLPT(I) = T0(I) − TLPTmin (I), then TLPTmin (I) < 0 can be derived from (3.12),
which is an obvious contradiction. Hence it must be the case that
devLPT(I) = TLPTmax (I)− T0(I).
Due to the definition of dev(I), for any arbitrary instance I, we have
dev∗(I) + T0(I) ≥ T ∗max(I).
Therefore,
ρLPT =
TLPTmax (I)
dev∗(I) + T0(I)
≤ T
LPT
max (I)
T ∗max(I)
≤ 2.
This completes the proof. 
The following example is to test the tightness of this bound.
Example 3.2. Consider an instance I with two uniform machines with speed s1 = 1
and s2 = a (a > 1) respectively, and a list of jobs, the sizes of which satisfy p1 ≥
· · · ≥ pn and
n∑
i=1
pi
a
= (pn − ε), (3.13)
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for ε→ 0. Accordingly, T0(I) = aa+1(pn − ε).
Due to (3.13), all the jobs will be assigned to the faster machine in LPT. Therefore,
TLPT1 (I) = 0; T
LPT
2 (I) =
∑
i
pi/a = (pn − ε).
However, in the optimal allocation, pn will be assigned to the slower machine, so
that
T ∗1 (I) = pn; T
∗
2 (I) =
a(pn − ε)− pn
a
.
As a result, the performance of LPT on instance I is calculated as
ρLPT(I) =
devLPT(I) + T0(I)
dev∗(I) + T0(I)
=
2a
a+1(pn − ε)
pn − aa+1(pn − ε) + aa+1(pn − ε)
=
2a
a+ 1
· pn − ε
pn
.
Notice that ρLPT(I)→ 2 as a→∞ and ε→ 0.
3.1.3 Monotonicity for LPT
According to Theorem 2.1, in a truthful algorithm, the workload of each machine
must remain non-increasing as its reporting speed decreases. The following example
illustrates a case where a machine ends up with more jobs by reporting a slower
speed, thus indicating that LPT cannot guarantee monotonicity.
Example 3.3. Consider two machines with speeds s1 = 10 and s2 = 9. Let the
job sequence be {20, 11, 10}. When applying LPT, the first job is assigned to M1,
followed by the second job assigned to M2. The last job is also assigned to M2 since
20+10
10 >
11+10
9 .
Now assume s1 reduces to 8, while s2 remains unchanged; thus M2 becomes the
faster machine. Applying LPT with the reduced speed set, the first job is now allo-
cated to M2, and the remaining two jobs are allocated to M1. The workload of M1
increases from 20 to 21 as its speed reduces, which implies LPT is manipulable.
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3.2 A quick result from makespan problem
Although the algorithm fails the monotonicity test, the study of LPT is instructive.
It reveals the potentiality of using algorithms designed for the makespan problem
to achieve good performance on the deviation problem. Now we present the general
result of applying algorithms designed for the makespan minimization problem to
the deviation minimization problem.
Theorem 3.3. Let algorithm A be α-approximate for the makespan minimization
problem.
• If α ≤ 2, then A is a 2-approximation algorithm for the deviation minimization
problem;
• If α > 2, then A is an α-approximation algorithm for the deviation minimiza-
tion problem.
Proof. Distinguish the optimal values derived under the deviation objective and
the makespan objective with superscripts D∗ and M∗, respectively. Assume that A
is an α-approximation algorithm for the makespan minimization problem, i.e.,
TAmax(I)
TM∗max(I)
≤ α. (3.14)
When devA(I) = T0(I)− TAmin(I) , we have
ρA(I) =
2T0(I)− TAmin(I)
devD
∗
(I) + T0(I)
≤ 2T0(I)
T0(I)
= 2.
If otherwise, devA(I) = TAmax(I)− T0(I), then
ρA(I) =
TAmax(I)
devD
∗
(I) + T0(I)
≤ T
A
max(I)
TD∗max(I)
≤ T
A
max
TM∗max(I)
≤ α.
The last inequality holds as a direct result from (3.14). This completes our proof. 
According to the theorem, any existing truthful mechanism for the makespan min-
imization problem can be directly implemented onto the deviation minimization
problem and maintain the level of performance if its approximation ratio is above 2.
In other words, when designing algorithms for the deviation minimization problem
with approximation ratio bigger than 2, one only needs to focus on the maximum
completion time. To further improve the performance, however, the algorithm de-
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signer needs to concern both the maximum completion time and the minimum com-
pletion time at the same time.
Now we apply the theorem to the Monotone-RF algorithm proposed by Andelman
et al. (2005), which is known to be truthful and 5-approximate for the makespan
problem. The algorithm is inspired by the fractional assignment which considers
each machine as a bin with bin size equal to the machine speed times a constant.
Definition 3.1. A fractional assignment is a schedule obtained by breaking each
job into pieces with sizes summing to the full size of that job, and assigning these
pieces to machines so that all the machines can finish their assigned workloads at
the same time.
Monotone-RF
Input: a job sequence σ, and a non-increasing sorted speeds vector
s = (s1, . . . , sm)
Step 1. Set t1 =
8
5s1.
Step 2. For i ≥ 2, let ti be the closest value of s12.5k such that ti ≤ si,
i.e. k = blog2.5 s1si c+ 1.
Step 3. Calculate the valid fractional assignment for the job sequence ε
given the new speeds vector t. Let T f (t) be the value of the
fractional solution.
Step 4. For each machine i = 1, . . . ,m, assign jobs in non-increasing
order of job size to Mi (using speed ti), until the completion
time of Mi exceeds or equals threshold T
f (t).
Step 5. Return the assignment.
Denote by T f the constant derived from applying the fractional assignment. A
fractional assignment is valid if for every piece assigned to Mi, the size of the job
that the piece belongs is no more than its bin size si ·T f . The smallest T f for which
there exists a valid fractional assignment is
T f = max
j
min
i
max
{
pj
si
,
∑j
k=1 pk∑i
l=1 sl
}
. (3.15)
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The fractional assignment does not yield a truthful result with general speeds. How-
ever, after rounding machine speeds followed by rules defined in Monotone-RF, An-
delman et al. (2005) prove the fractional assignment becomes monotone.
According to Theorem 3.3, Monotone-RF is a 5-approximate algorithm for the de-
viation minimization objective. Moreover, it remains monotone as it is a direct
application of the algorithm. Finally we show that 5 is a tight bound.
Example 3.4. Consider an instance with 6 machines and 6 jobs. Both machine
speeds and job sizes are (1, 1, 1, 1 − ε, 1 − ε, 0.4). The optimal solution for this in-
stance is obvious: each machine receives a job with the same size as its speed. The
maximum deviation dev∗ equals 0 as a result.
Now apply Monotone-RF to this instance. According to (3.15),
T f (t) = max
{
0.4
0.16
,
5.4 + ε
3.36
}
= 2.5,
and the adjusted speeds vector t is
(1.6, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0.16).
Thus, the bin sizes of each machine become
(4, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0.4).
Monotone-RF only stops assigning jobs to machines when the workload of the current
machine exceeds its bin size. Accordingly, the five biggest jobs are all assigned to the
first machine, which leaves a deviation of 4−2ε. The approximation ratio, therefore,
is 5− 2ε, which approaches to 5 when ε→ 0.
3.3 LPT*
Using the same rounding skills, LPT can also become a truthful algorithm. The
conjecture was made by Auletta et al. (2004), and was confirmed by Kova´cs (2005)
with her adjusted LPT, or LPT*. In her work, Kova´cs (2005) shows that LPT*
is truthful and yields 3-approximation ratio for the makespan problem. In the
conclusion, she made a conjecture that the bound of LPT* can be further reduced
to 8/3. In the following section, we show that a tighter bound is achievable regardless
28
of the false conjecture of 8/3.
LPT*
Input: a non-increasing sorted job sizes vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) and a
non-increasing sorted machine speeds vector s = (s1, . . . , sm)
Step 1. Round the machine speeds down to ti := 2
blog2 sic, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
(the rounded speeds remain ordered).
Step 2. Assign jobs in p to machines with the adjusted speeds based
on LPT; tie is broken by assigning the job to the slowest
machine with the smallest index.
Step 3. Among machines of the same rounded speed, reorder the
assigned work such that Wi ≥Wi+1 holds.
Step 4. Return the assignment.
3.3.1 A counter example
We first show with a concrete example that breaks the conjecture of 8/3.
Example 3.5. Consider an instance with 21710 machines, among which two ma-
chines have speed 1023.84, one’s speed is 64.08 and the remaining 21707 machines
have speed 1.999. The job set contains 46347 jobs, with sizes listed in the table in
non-increasing order.
No. of jobs 1085 2946 2946 2946 2946 2946 2946 2946
Job sizes 1.279 1.24 1.201 1.162 1.123 1.084 1.045 1.006
No. of jobs 2946 2946 2946 2946 2946 2946 2946 4018
Job sizes 0.993 0.954 0.915 0.876 0.837 0.798 0.759 0.72
Table 3.3: Total jobs
In the optimal solution, each of the fastest two machines with speed 1023.84 receives
1422 jobs of size 0.72, and the machine with speed 64.08 receives 89 jobs with size
0.72. This gives each of them a completion time of 1. The allocations of the rest of
the slow machines are summarized in Table 3.4, with the second column represent-
ing the size of each job assigned to a machine and the first column representing the
number of such machines. For instance, the first row of the table says that there are
1085 machines of speed 1.999 assigning with two jobs, the sizes of which are 1.279
and 0.72 respectively. It is easy to calculate that each slow machine receives a total
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workload of 1.999, equal to its machine speed. So far, we have finished the allocation
of all jobs to machines and derived an optimal makespan of 1. Since the makespan
of this allocation is exactly T0, it is for sure that the makespan cannot be further
improved.
No. of machines Job allocation
1085 (1.279, 0.72)
2946 (1.24, 0.759)
2946 (1.201, 0.798)
2946 (1.162, 0.837)
2946 (1.123, 0.876)
2946 (1.084, 0.915)
2946 (1.045, 0.954)
2946 (1.006, 0.993)
Table 3.4: Job allocation on machines with speed 1.999
The allocation under LPT* is shown in Figure 3.1. Due to the large number of
machines, those with the same job allocation are represented as one column with a
number in bracket below showing how many of such machines exist. For example,
1085 machines with adjusted speed 1 are allocated two jobs with both sizes equal to
0.993. For the same reason, we did not list every single job allocated to the fast
machines, but used the number in brackets to show how many times the job with
the same size is assigned to the machine. The maximum completion time for this
allocation is 1.279×63+0.993×46+0.72×6264.08 ≈ 2.6669, which exceeds 8/3 ≈ 2.6667.
Comparing the total workload assigned to each machine in OPT and in LPT* in
the above counter example, it is obvious that all three fast machines receives more
workload in LPT* than in OPT. Since the total workload should remain the same,
the extra workload assigned to the fast machines in LPT* must be compensated by
the slow machines. Suppose there is no restriction on the number of slow machines
which recieve less workload in LPT* than in OPT, then the workload assigned to
fast machines, and therefore, the makespan will increase without limit. However,
in the following section, we will show case by case that the amount of workload
that can be compensated by the slow machines is restricted by the fast machines
themselves.
3.4 Improved upper bound for LPT*
In this section, we provide an improved upper bound for LPT*. Before the proof,
we would like to highlight some frequently used properties of the LPT* algorithm,
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which will facilitate the subsequent proofs.
Proposition 3.4 (Kova´cs, 2005). In LPT* scheduling the following hold:
• If tl = ti/2, then Ml receives its first job after the first job of Mi and before
the second job of Mi.
• If ti = ti+1 and pj is the first job assigned to Mi, then pj+1 is the first job
assigned to Mi+1.
In addition to the above property pointed out by Kova´cs (2005), the following feature
holds for LPT*.
Proposition 3.5. Let tl = 2
ηti for some η ≥ 0. In LPT* scheduling, Ml receives
at most 2η − 1 jobs before the first job of Mi.
Proof. Let p∗ be the last job of Ml before the first job of Mi. Denote Wi(pj) the
amount of work assigned to Mi right before pj . According to LPT*, we derive
Wl(p
∗) + p∗
tl
<
p∗
ti
=⇒ Wl(p∗) + p∗ < 2η · p∗.
Since the sizes of all the jobs assigned before p∗ are at least p∗, Wl(p∗) +p∗ contains
at most 2η − 1 jobs. 
Proposition 3.5 states that before the slow machine gets its first job, not too many
jobs can be allocated to the fast machines in LPT*. This implies that although
LPT* prioritizes the faster machines in assigning jobs, the priority is not unlimited.
3.4.1 Preliminaries
Some preliminary work and definitions are introduced in this part. Denote by
T ∗max(I) the optimal makespan and Tmax(I) the makespan generated by LPT* for
instance I. Define θ(I) = Tmax(I)/T
∗
max(I) the approximation ratio we are going to
bound for any instance I. The main body of the proof employs the minimum counter
example approach. Let I∗ denote an instance with the minimum number of jobs
that satisfies θ(I∗) > 2.8. Let k be the smallest machine index with the maximum
completion time (i.e., the bottleneck machine in the makespan problem) in LPT*
and pn be the last job assigned to Mk. We delete all the jobs after pn without de-
creasing θ(I∗); thus, pn becomes the smallest job in the minimum counter-example.
If not explicitly specified, the instance considered in the proofs is minimum counter
example I∗. For simplicity, I∗ is omitted if doing so causes no confusion.
32
Denote Wi and W
∗
i the total amount of work assigned to Mi by LPT* and OPT
respectively. Assume w.l.o.g. that T ∗max = 1. Accordingly,
W ∗i ≤ T ∗max · si < 2ti, ∀Mi ∈M. (3.16)
Lemma 3.6. There exists Mi, such that Wi < 2ti.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that Wi ≥ 2ti for all machines, then the total
amount of work assigned in LPT* is at least 2
∑
Mi∈M ti. Nevertheless, the total
amount of work assigned in OPT is less than 2
∑
Mi∈M ti according to (3.16). This
is a contradiction since the total workload assigned in both schedules remain the
same. Therefore, there exists at least one Mi, such that Wi < 2ti. 
Lemma 3.6 allows to define h as the smallest index that satisfies
Wh < 2th · T ∗max = 2th. (3.17)
Hence for all i < h,
Wi ≥ 2ti · T ∗max = 2ti. (3.18)
Let r be the largest index of machine with positive workload in LPT*, and assume
that
th = 2
βtr, (3.19)
where β is some integer. Assume that tr = 1. This can be achieved by dividing
each original speed by the smallest non-empty adjusted speed. Notice that this
assumption will not lose generality of our proof, because machine speeds and job
sizes can be adjusted proportionally so that 1 ≤ sr < 2, and T ∗max = 1 remains
unchanged. We illustrate the generality of this assumption with an example.
Example 3.6. Consider a set of speeds s = {27, 16, 13, 5}, the adjusted speeds of
which are t = {16, 16, 8, 4}. Assume that when allocating a set of jobs on these
machines, the slowest machine is non-empty in LPT*; thus, tr = 4 in this case.
Dividing each original speed by 4 derives s′ = {6.75, 4, 3.25, 1.25}. Since machine
speeds reduce proportionally, the optimal solution remains unchanged. The adjusted
speeds for s′ are t′ = {4, 4, 2, 1}, which also reduced proportionally compared to t; as
a result, the allocation under LPT* also remains unchanged. Finally, the job size is
adjusted according to s′, so that T ∗max = 1.
A machine speed can be smaller than 1, but according to our assumption such a
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machine is empty (i.e., with zero workload) in LPT*. The following example is used
to illustrate h, r and β.
Example 3.7. Consider an instance with 20 machines. The speeds of the five
fastest machines are 15.1, 6.9, 6.8, 3.9 and 3.9 and the rests are 1.9. Jobs needed
to be allocated are: 15 jobs with sizes 1.9 and 1.4, respectively, and 12 jobs with size
1.3. The average completion time is T0 = 1. In the optimal solution, each machine
receives a workload equal to its machine speed, therefore T ∗max = 1, which complies
with our assumption.
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4 1.3 1.3
1.4 1.3 1.3
1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 15
1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 ︷ ︸︸ ︷
1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.9 · · · 1.9
Machine speeds 15.1 6.9 6.8 3.9 3.9 1.9 · · · 19
Table 3.5: Job allocation in OPT
Now allocate jobs to machines following LPT*. The result is shown in Table 3.6.
The resulting workload of each machine is presented in the last row. As can be seen,
the workloads of the first five machines all exceed two times their adjusted speeds.
The maximum completion time 18.515.1 ≈ 1.225 is achieved on the fastest machine.
Hence, h = 6, r = 20, k = 1, and β = 0.
Next let us consider some characteristics of I∗. Let sk = αtk for some 1 ≤ α < 2.
In LPT*, we have
Tmax =
Wk
sk
=
Wk
α · tk = θ ≥ 2.8 =⇒ Wk = α · θ · tk (3.20)
for the bottleneck machine Mk, and
Wi + pn
ti
≥ α · θ =⇒ Wi ≥ α · θ · ti − pn (3.21)
for a non-bottleneck machine Mi.
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1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.9
1.9
1.9 1.3 1.3
1.9 1.3 1.3
1.9 1.9 1.9 1.3 1.3 15
1.9 1.9 1.9 1.3 1.3 ︷ ︸︸ ︷
1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.4 · · · 1.4
Machine speeds 8 4 4 2 2 1 · · · 1
Workload 18.5 8.3 8.3 4.5 4.5 1.4 · · · 14
Table 3.6: Job allocation in LPT*
Lemma 3.7. If a machine is empty in LPT*, then it remains empty in OPT.
Proof. Let Mi be an empty machine in LPT*, i.e., Wi = 0. According to (3.21),
we derive
pn
ti
> θ =⇒ pn > 2ti.
However, since T ∗max = 1, W ∗i < 2ti, which implies that the biggest job assigned to
Mi in OPT is smaller than pn. Notice that all jobs smaller than pn are deleted from
an instance. Therefore, Mi remains empty in OPT. 
Corollary 3.8. Wh > 0 and β ≥ 0.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that Wh = 0, then any machine after h is also
empty in LPT*. According to Lemma 3.7, W ∗i = 0 for all i ≥ h. On the other hand,
due to the definition of Mh, we have∑
i<h
Wi ≥ 2
∑
i<h
ti >
∑
i<h
W ∗i ,
which implies that the amount of workload assigned in LPT* exceeds that in OPT,
and that gives a contradiction.
According to the definition of r, we have h ≤ r, i.e., th ≥ tr, which implies that
β ≥ 0. 
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Let i = h in (3.21), we derive
pn > 2
β · θ −Wh > 2β · θ − 2th = (θ − 2) · 2β.
Since Wh > 0, thus Wh ≥ pn, which in turn implies
(θ − 2) · 2β < pn < 2β+1. (3.22)
Finally, we provide the following definitions that are often referred to in the proofs
before presenting the formal proof.
Definition 3.2. Mi is a taker if Wi > W
∗
i ; Mi is a giver if Wi < W
∗
i ; Mi is a
deadwood if Wi = W
∗
i .
We indicate these three types of machines with a concrete example.
Example 3.8. Consider the following example, which contains 6 machines with
speeds
(14, 3.9, 3.9, 3.9, 3.9, 1).
We assign a total number of 9 jobs to these machines, of which 4 have size 3.9 and 5
have size 2.8. In the optimal solution, apart from the slowest machine, each machine
is assigned a workload equal to its speed.
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.8 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9
Machine speeds 14 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 1
Table 3.7: Job allocation in OPT
In LPT*, the slowest machine remains slack, while the workload on the fastest ma-
chine increased by (3.9− 2.8)× 3 = 3.3, which leads to the makespan increasing to
14+3.3
14 ≈ 1.24.
In the above example, M1 is a taker, M3 to M5 are the givers, while M2 and M6 are
deadwood. The approximation ratio derived from the example instance is quite low.
This is because with only three givers in the instance, the workload contributed by
the givers is not sufficient to satisfy the workload required by (3.20) and (3.21) if θ
derives a larger value.
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2.8
2.8
3.9
3.9
3.9 3.9 2.8 2.8 2.8
Machine speeds 8 2 2 2 2 1
Table 3.8: Job allocation in LPT*
Definition 3.3. A series of sets of machines and their corresponding notations are
defined as follows:
- Set of 1-machines: S1 = {Mi|ti = 1};
- Set of 1˜-machines: S>1 = {Mi|ti > 1};
- Set of 2-machines: S2 = {Mi|ti = 2};
- Set of 2˜-machines: S>2 = {Mi|ti > 2};
- Set of non-empty machines: M = {Mi|Wi > 0}.
3.4.2 An easy case
An easy parametric bound of LPT* is provided for a general instance I.
Proposition 3.9. θ(I) ≤ 2 + 2
2β−1 for β ≥ 1.
Proof. Let p∗ be the first job of Mr in LPT*, then
Wh(p
∗) + p∗
th
≥ p
∗
tr
.
Together with (3.17) and (3.22), we derive
2β+1 = 2th >Wh(p
∗) ≥ p∗ · (th − 1) ≥ pn · (th − 1) > 2β(θ(I)− 2)(2β − 1)
=⇒ 2 > (θ(I)− 2)(2β − 1)
β≥1
===⇒ θ(I) < 2 + 2
2β − 1 .

The parametric bound only depends on β, and therefore is easy to compute. It
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provides a much more accurate bound for LPT* particularly when β is big. Ad-
ditionally, Proposition 3.9 states that θ < 83 for β ≥ 2. On the other hand, β
is a non-negative integer. Thus we only need to consider the bound of LPT* for
β ∈ {0, 1}.
3.4.3 β = 0 and OPT assigns one job to each 1-machine
When β = 0, we derive th = 1 from (3.19), which implies
Wi > 2ti > W
∗
i , ∀ Mi ∈ S>1
according to the definition of Mh. In other words, all 1˜-machines are takers, which
leaves 1-machines to be the only possible givers.
For any feasible solution, the following equation must hold:∑
ti>1
(Wi −W ∗i ) =
∑
ti=1
(W ∗i −Wi). (3.23)
This is because the total workload assigned in OPT equals to that in LPT* for a
feasible solution. In what follows, we show that (3.23) will be violated. The left-hand
side of (3.23) presents the minimum amount of workload needed to be compensated
by the entire set of givers. We first derive a lower bound for it, i.e.,
min
pi
{∑
ti>1
(Wi −W ∗i )
}
≥ LB.
Then we show that the maximum workload can be compensated by the givers, i.e.,
the upper bound for the right-hand side is strictly smaller than LB. In mathematical
terms,
max
pi
{∑
ti=1
(W ∗i −Wi)
}
≤ UB < LB.
Notice that for ti ≥ 2, Wi is bounded by the bigger value between (3.21) and (3.18).
While α · θ · ti − pn > 2ti for ti ≥ 2. In other words, Wi is bounded by (3.21) for
ti ≥ 2 in (3.23). As a result, we derive∑
ti>1
(Wi −W ∗i ) >
∑
ti>1
(θti − pn −W ∗i ) = LB. (3.24)
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In fact, LB can be written as a function of the adjusted speeds of all the 1˜-machines
due to (3.16). Once S>1 is fixed (in an arbitrary way), LB becomes a fixed value
which can be reached when si = Wi → 2ti, ∀ Mi ∈ S>1.
Next, we show that for each fixed S>1, there exists an instance that maximizes
UB. We call such an instance the best case. A best case instance has the following
properties:
1. The number of 1-machines, denoted by `, is no less than
∑
ti>1
(ti − 1);
2. In OPT, the length of jobs assigned to 1-machines are no less than the length
of jobs assigned to 1˜-machines;
3. The first largest
∑
ti>1
(ti − 1) jobs are assigned before LPT* assigns the first
job to a 1-machine.
The properties do not contradict to each other, meaning that they can co-exist in
the same instance. Now we show that the best case allows UB to be maximized.
Lemma 3.10 (Epstein et al., 2013). Assume that s1 ≤ s2 ≤ · · · ≤ sm. There
exists an optimal schedule pi for the makespan minimization problem which satisfies
W1(pi) ≤W2(pi) ≤ · · · ≤Wm(pi).
Renumber all the 1-machines so that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ · · · ≥ s`. Denote by q∗i the unique
job assigned to 1-machine Mi in OPT. According to Lemma 3.10, there exists an
optimal solution such that q∗1 ≥ q∗2 ≥ · · · ≥ q∗` . Define q∗0 = 2. Denote by qi the first
job assigned to 1-machine Mi in LPT*.
Claim 3.1. For 1 ≤ j ≤ ` and j′ ≤ j, if qj′ ∈ [q∗j , q∗j−1), then Wj′+a ≥ q∗j+a, for
a = 0, . . . , `− j.
Proof. Since qj′ ≥ q∗j , q∗j+1 has not yet been allocated after 1-machine j′ gets
its first job; thus the next available job to be assigned is at least as big as q∗j+1.
On the other hand, LPT* will assign the next available job to 2-machine j′ + 1.
Together we derive that qj′+1 ≥ q∗j+1. Similarly, we have qj′+2 ≥ q∗j+2 and so on, un-
til qj′+`−j ≥ q∗` . Since Wj′+a ≥ qj′+a, we derive Wj′+a ≥ q∗j+a, for a = 0, . . . , `−j. 
Let j′ = 1, we derive a special case for Claim 3.1.
Claim 3.2. If q1 ∈ [q∗j , q∗j−1) for j = 1, . . . , `, then W1+a ≥ q∗j+a, for a = 0, . . . , `−j.
Claim 3.3. If q1 ∈ [q∗j , q∗j−1) for j = 1, . . . , `, then j − 1 ≤
∑
ti>1
(ti − 1).
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Proof. According to the sequence of LPT*, all jobs that are bigger than or equal to
q∗j−1 are assigned before q1, which is the first job that LPT* assigns to a 1-machine.
According to the assumption of q∗1 ≥ q∗2 ≥ · · · ≥ q∗j−1, there are at least j − 1 such
jobs assigned before q1. On the other hand, according to Proposition 3.5, each 1˜-
machine i receives at most ti−1 jobs before the first job of a 1-machine. This implies
that the total number of jobs that can be assigned before q` is at most
∑
ti>1
(ti−1).
Together we have j − 1 ≤∑ti>1(ti − 1). 
Subsequently, let us consider the right-hand side of equation (3.23). According
to Claim 3.2, for q1 ∈ [q∗j , q∗j−1) (1 ≤ j ≤ `), the right-hand side of (3.23) becomes
∑
ti=1
(W ∗i −Wi) =
∑`
i=1
(q∗i −Wi)
=
j−1∑
i=1
q∗i + q
∗
j + · · ·+ q∗` −W1 − · · · −W`−j+1 −
j−1∑
i=1
W`−j+1+i
≤
j−1∑
i=1
q∗i + q
∗
j + · · ·+ q∗` − q∗j − · · · − q∗` −
j−1∑
i=1
W`−j+1+i (3.25)
=
j−1∑
i=1
(q∗i −W`−j+1+i).
For each Mi ∈ S1, we have q∗i < 2 and Wi ≥ f , where f = max{θ−pn, pn}. Together
with Claim 3.3, we derive
∑
ti=1
(W ∗i −Wi) ≤
j−1∑
i=1
(q∗i −W`−j+1+i) <
∑
ti>1
(ti − 1)(2− f) = UB. (3.26)
According to (3.25), UB is maximized when j − 1 attains its largest possible value,
i.e., j − 1 = ∑ti>1(ti − 1). In other words, LPT* assigns the largest ∑ti>1(ti − 1)
jobs from q∗i to 1˜-machines before it assigns the first job to a 1-machine. These
together indicate Properties 1 and 3. Furthermore, (3.26) implies that UB is max-
imized when W1+a = q
∗
j+a, for a = 0, . . . , ` − j. This indicates that q∗j , q∗j+1, . . . , q∗`
are assigned to the first `−j+1 1-machines in LPT*, and therefore Property 2 is true.
Notice that for each item in (3.26), there is a corresponding item in (3.24). De-
note by LBi and UBi the items associated to ti in (3.24) and (3.26) respectively.
Let us compare the values of LB and UB pairwise. For each ti ≥ 4, when pn ≥ θ2 ,
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f = pn. Together with (3.16), we have
LBi −UBi =(θti − pn −W ∗i )− (ti − 1) · (2− f)
>(θti − pn − 2ti)− (ti − 1) · (2− pn)
=(θ − 4 + pn)ti + 2− 2pn
≥2pn + 4θ − 14 > 5θ − 14 ≥ 0.
When pn <
θ
2 , f = θ − pn, and similarly
LBi −UBi =(θti − pn −W ∗i )− (ti − 1) · (2− f)
>(θti − pn − 2ti)− (ti − 1) · (2− θ + pn)
=(2θ − 4− pn)ti + 2− θ
≥7θ − 14− 4pn > 5θ − 14 ≥ 0.
Finally, for each ti = 2, ti − 1 = 1. In other words, there is a unique 1-machine
in each of the corresponding items in (3.26). The best case requires a job of size
p˜ ≥ θ − pn to be assigned to this 1-machine in LPT*. Moreover, p˜ is assigned to
Mi in OPT. This is because in the proof for ti′ ≥ 4, it is assumed that the entire
workload assigned to Mi′ in OPT has been distributed between Mi′ and its corre-
sponding ti′ − 1 1-machines, with no extra workload left to compensate other pairs.
When 1.2 < pn < 2, we show that Mi contains at most two jobs in OPT. As-
sume to the contrary that there are more than two jobs on Mi in OPT, then after
taking p˜ from W ∗i , the remaining workload should be at least 2pn. Since W
∗
i < 4
for ti = 2, we derive 2pn ≤W ∗i − p˜ < W ∗i − θ+ pn =⇒ pn ≤ 1.2, which contradicts
pn > 1.2. According to the job allocation sequence in LPT*, p˜ is the bigger one,
and therefore W ∗i ≤ 2p˜. Thus,
LBi −UBi =(θti − pn −W ∗i )− (ti − 1) · (2− p˜)
≥2θ − pn − 2p˜− 2 + p˜ ≥ 2.2− p˜ > 0.
When pn ≤ 1.2,
LBi −UBi =(θti − pn −W ∗i )− (ti − 1) · (2− p˜)
≥2θ − pn − 4− 2 + θ − pn > 2.4− 2p˜ ≥ 0.
To sum up, we show that each item in (3.26) is strictly smaller than the correspond-
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ing item in (3.24). Thus, we prove LB > UB.
3.4.4 β = 0 and OPT assigns two jobs to some 1-machines
If there exists a 1-machine that receives two jobs in OPT, then pn < 1. Additionally,
if 1-machine Mi receives more than two jobs in LPT*, then it becomes a taker since
Wi ≥ 3pn > 2 > W ∗i . There is no need to consider the case where a taker 1-machine
exists, because it will only reduce the value of
∑
ti=1
(W ∗i −Wi).
Denote by `0 and `1 respectively, the number of 1-machines that contain only 1
job in OPT and LPT*. The entire set of jobs assigned to 1-machines in OPT can
be presented as q∗1 ≥ q∗2 ≥ · · · ≥ q∗2`−`0 . Denote by N ≤
∑
ti>1
(ti − 1) the number
of jobs assigned by LPT* before the first job of a 1-machine. Since W ∗i → 2 for all
1-machines is a condition for maximizing
∑
ti=1
(W ∗i −Wi), we are able to construct
a job allocation in OPT as shown in Table 3.9. We consider the cases for `1 = 0
and `1 > 0 in turn.
M1 M2 · · · M`0 M`0+1 M`0+2 · · · M`
q∗`0+1 q
∗
`0+2
· · · q∗`q∗1 q∗2 · · · q∗`0 q∗2`−`0 q∗2`−`0−1 · · · q∗`+1
Table 3.9: Job allocation on 1-machines in OPT
When `1 = 0, all the giver 1-machines receive two jobs in LPT*, which implies that
`0 ≤ N . One additional property is added on top of the previous properties of a
best case, which requires `0 = 0.
Now assign jobs to machines under LPT*. According to the best case, jobs assigned
to 1-machines in OPT will be the first jobs to assign. The first N jobs from q∗1 to
q∗N are assigned to 1˜-machines, followed by the next ` jobs, from q
∗
N+1 to q
∗
N+`, each
being assigned to a 1-machine. Among the remaining `− `0 −N jobs from q∗N+`+1
to q∗2`−`0 , assume that N1 are assigned to 1˜-machines, and the rest `− `0 −N −N1
jobs, marked as q1, . . . , q`−`0−N−N1 , are assigned to 1-machines. Further assume
that among the N1 jobs assigned to 1˜-machines, N2, marked as q
′
1, . . . , q
′
N2
, are as-
signed to Mi, for i = `0 + 1, . . . , N , in OPT. The remaining N1 −N2 jobs, marked
as q′′1 , . . . , q′′N1−N2 , are assigned to Mi, for i = N + 1, . . . , `, in OPT.
Since each 1-machine receives two jobs, LPT* still needs another `0 + N + N1
jobs to occupy the remaining 1-machines. Denote these jobs as p1, . . . , p`0+N+N1 .
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To sum up, the total 2` jobs assigned to 1-machines by LPT* are: q∗N+1, . . . , q
∗
N+`,
q1, . . . , q`−`0−N−N1 , and p1, . . . , p`0+N+N1 . Together with pi ≥ pn, we derive
∑
ti=1
(W ∗i −Wi) =
 `0∑
i=1
q∗i +
N∑
i=`0+1
q∗i +
N+∑`
i=N+1
q∗i +
2`−`0∑
i=N+`+1
q∗i

−
(
N+∑`
i=N+1
q∗i +
`−`0−N−N1∑
i=1
qi +
`0+N+N1∑
i=1
pi
)
≤
 `0∑
i=1
q∗i +
N∑
i=`0+1
q∗i +
N+∑`
i=N+1
q∗i +
2`−`0∑
i=N+`+1
q∗i

−
(
N+∑`
i=N+1
q∗i +
`−`0−N−N1∑
i=1
qi + (`0 +N +N1)pn
)
.
Now we are going to derive the upper bound of the above equation. Notice that if a
job is assigned to a 1-machine in both LPT* and OPT, then this job will be canceled
out in the above inequalities, and therefore, has no influence on the upper bound.
Therefore, UB only depends on jobs that are assigned to different parties in OPT
and LPT*. These include the N +N1 jobs that are assigned to 1-machines in OPT
yet being assigned to 1˜-machines in LPT*, and `0 +N +N1 jobs that are assigned
to 1˜-machines in OPT yet being assigned to 1-machines in LPT*. We classify these
jobs into groups, and discuss the upper bound for each group.
For each i = 1, . . . , `0, we have
q∗i − 2pn < 2− 2pn. (3.27)
For each q′i (i = 1, . . . , N2), it is possible to find a corresponding job from q
∗
i′ (i
′ =
`0 + 1, . . . , N), so that q
′
i and q
∗
i′ are assigned to the same 1-machine in OPT. Thus,
q′i + q
∗
i′ − 2pn < 2− 2pn. (3.28)
For the rest N − `0 −N2 jobs in q∗i (i = `0 + 1, . . . , N), we have
q∗i − pn < 2− pn − pn = 2− 2pn. (3.29)
Finally, for each q′′i (i = 1, . . . , N1−N2), it is possible to find a corresponding job from
q∗i′ (i
′ = N + 1, . . . , N + `), so that q′i and q
∗
i′ are assigned to the same 1-machine in
OPT. Additionally, q∗i′ is among the first ` jobs assigned to the 1-machines in LPT*,
43
therefore q∗i′ + pn ≥ f , where f = max{θ − pn, 2pn}. Thus,
q′i + q
∗
i′ − (q∗i′ + pn) = q′i − pn < 2− f. (3.30)
From the combination of (3.27), (3.28), (3.29), and (3.30), we derive∑
ti=1
(W ∗i −Wi) <`0(2− 2pn) +N2(2− 2pn) + (N − `0 −N2)(2− 2pn)
+ (N1 −N2)(2− f) = N(2− 2pn) + (N1 −N2)(2− f) = UB.
It is clear that UB is independent of `0, therefore let `0 = 0 for simplicity. Since
2−f > 0, to maximize UB, we shall let N2 = 0. In addition, due to 2−2pn ≥ 2−f ,
we shall let N attain its maximum possible number, which is
∑
ti>1
(ti − 1). Fi-
nally, since each of the first N jobs assigned to 1˜-machines will increase UB by
q∗i − pn < 2 − pn − pn, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we let the length of these N jobs be as
big as possible.
If UB ≥ LB, then according to (3.24), we have
N(2− 2pn)+(N1 −N2)(2− f) ≥
∑
ti>1
(θti − pn − 2ti)
=⇒ N1(2− f) ≥
∑
ti>1
(θti − pn − 2ti)−
∑
ti>1
(ti − 1)(2− 2pn)
=
∑
ti>1
(θti − 4ti + 2tipn + 2− 3pn). (3.31)
In what follows, we show that (3.31) will be violated, thus we derive UB < LB.
Claim 3.4. q∗i < 2− pn, for i = 1, . . . , 2`.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists q∗i ≥ 2 − pn. Since `0 = 0, all
1-machines receive two jobs in OPT. Notice that q∗i is assigned to some 1-machine
Mi′ in OPT. Thus for Mi′ , we have W
∗
i′ ≥ 2− pn + pn = 2, contradicting to (3.16).

Claim 3.5. Before LPT* assigns its first 2` jobs (i.e., q∗i , i = 1, . . . , 2`), the
makespan in the best case will not exceed 2.
Proof. In the best case, the largest N =
∑
ti>1
(ti − 1) jobs, i.e., q∗1, . . . , q∗N , are
assigned to the 1˜-machines first. Hence before the first job on a 1-machine, each
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1˜-machine Mi receives ti − 1 jobs with sizes no bigger than 2− pn, i.e.,
Wi(q
∗
N+1)
ti
≤ (ti − 1)(2− pn)
ti
< 2, ∀ Mi ∈ S>1,
where Wi(pj) denotes the total amount of workload on Mi right before the assign-
ment of pj as defined previously. Subsequently, jobs q
∗
N+1, . . . , q
∗
N+` are assigned to
1-machines. Accordingly, job assignments on 1-machines in LPT* are as below.
M1 M2 · · · M`−N M`−N+1 · · · M`
q∗N+1 q
∗
N+2 · · · q∗` q∗`+1 · · · q∗N+`
· · · · · ·
Table 3.10: Job allocation on 1-machines in LPT*
Since q∗i < 2 − pn, up to this point, the completion times on each 1-machine are
strictly smaller than 2. Next we will show that for the last `−N jobs from q∗i , none
of them can be assigned to a machine with a resulting completion time greater than
2.
Before assigning q∗N+`+1, there is only one job on M`, and W` = q
∗
N+`. Therefore,
W`(q
∗
N+`+1) + q
∗
N+`+1
1
= q∗N+` + q
∗
N+`+1 < 2.
If q∗N+`+1 is not assigned to M`, then it must be assigned to another machine which
completes it earlier. Similarly, before assigning q∗N+i, i ∈ {`+ 1, . . . , 2`−N}, there
is only one job on M2`+1−i, and W2`+1−i = q∗N+2`+1−i. Therefore,
W2`+1−i(q∗N+i) + q
∗
N+i
1
= q∗N+2`+1−i + q
∗
N+i < 2,
which implies that q∗N+i must be assigned to some machine that completes it no later
than M2`+1−i does. To sum up, all the jobs that are assigned to 1-machines in OPT
will be processed within a completion time less than 2. This completes our proof. 
Denote p¯ the average size of the N1 jobs assigned to 1˜-machines. According to
Claim 3.5,
N(2− pn) +N1p¯ <
∑
ti>1
2ti =⇒ N1 <
∑
ti>1
(pnti + 2− pn)
p¯
. (3.32)
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Carrying (3.32) into (3.31) we derive∑
ti>1
(pnti + 2− pn)
p¯
· (2− f) >
∑
ti>1
(θti − 4ti + 2tipn + 2− 3pn)
=⇒
∑
ti>1
(pnti + 2− pn) · (2− f) >
∑
ti>1
(θti − 4ti + 2tipn + 2− 3pn) · p¯
≥
∑
ti>1
(θti − 4ti + 2tipn + 2− 3pn) · pn. (3.33)
When 2pn ≥ θ − pn, bringing f = 2pn into (3.33), we derive∑
ti>1
(
(4p2n − 6pn + θpn)ti − 5p2n + 8pn − 4
) ≤ 0.
However, since ti ≥ 2 and 4p2n − 6pn + θpn > 0, we have
(4p2n − 6pn + θpn)ti − 5p2n + 8pn − 4
≥8p2n − 12pn + 2θpn − 5p2n + 8pn − 4
=3p2n − 4pn + 2θpn − 4 > 0.
which is a clear contradiction.
When 2pn < θ − pn, bringing f = θ − pn into (3.33), we derive∑
ti>1
(
(p2n − 6pn + 2θpn)ti − 2p2n + 2pn − θpn + 2θ − 4
) ≤ 0.
Similarly, since ti ≥ 2 and p2n − 6pn + 2θpn > 0, we have
(p2n − 6pn + 2θpn)ti − 2p2n + 2pn − θpn + 2θ − 4
≥2p2n − 12pn + 4θpn − 2p2n + 2pn − θpn + 2θ − 4
=3θpn − 10pn − 4 + 2θ ≥ 1.6− 1.6pn > 0.
So far, we have shown a contradiction to (3.31), and therefore, LB > UB.
Finally let us consider `1 > 0. We first show that for `1 > 0, the best case has
the following properties:
1. `1 = ` and `0 = N ;
2. The number of 1-machines, denoted by `, is strictly more than
∑
ti>1
(ti − 1);
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3. Denote by q∗i and p
∗
i the job assigned to 1-machine and 1˜-machine in OPT
respectively; have
q∗1 ≥ · · · ≥ q∗`0 ≥ p∗1 · · · ≥ p∗`1 ≥ θ − pn > 2− pn ≥ q∗`0+1 ≥ · · · ≥ q∗2`−`0 ;
4. The first largest
∑
ti>1
(ti − 1) jobs are assigned before LPT* assigns the first
job to a 1-machine.
We would like to point out that Properties 2 and 4 are the same as Properties 1
and 3 in Section 3.4.3. While Property 3 is a special case of the previous Property
2 under the condition of `1 > 0. We first show that if `1 > 0, then a best case must
satisfy `0 = N .
Claim 3.6. If Mi receives only one job in LPT*, then Mi−1 must also receive only
one job in LPT*.
Proof. Denote by pi and pi−1 the first job assigned to Mi and Mi−1 respectively
in LPT*. Accordingly we have pi−1 ≥ pi. Therefore, Mi will receive its second job
before Mi−1. 
Since `1 > 0, there exists a 1-machine Mi which receives only one job in LPT*.
Together with Claim 3.6, we conclude that M1 receives only one job in LPT*. De-
note this job by p∗. According to (3.21), W1 = p∗ ≥ θ− pn, which implies that jobs
assigned before p∗ are no smaller than θ − pn > 1.8. In a best case, these jobs are
assigned to 1-machines in OPT; therefore, we have `0 ≥ N .
Denote pi ≥ θ − pn (i = 1, . . . , `1) the only job assigned to 1-machine Mi in LPT*.
If pi is assigned to a 1-machine Mi′ in OPT, then pi must be the only job on Mi′ in
OPT. This makes W ∗i′ and Wi cancel out each other in
∑
ti=1
(W ∗i −Wi). Such pi
has no impact on increasing the upper bound of
∑
ti=1
(W ∗i −Wi). As a result, we
can assume that all the pi are assigned to 1˜-machines in OPT. Therefore `0 ≤ N ,
and together with `0 ≥ N , we derive `0 = N .
Now apply LPT*. The largest `0 jobs, from q
∗
1 to q
∗
`0
, are assigned to 1˜-machines,
before the next ` jobs being assigned to 1-machines. Among these ` jobs, the first
`1 jobs, i.e., p
∗
1, . . . , p
∗
`1
, are strictly greater than θ − pn. This is because they are
the only jobs assigned to a 1-machine in LPT*. Additionally, as indicated by the
best case, these jobs are assigned to 1˜-machines in OPT. The remaining `− `1 jobs,
from q∗`0+1 to q
∗
`0+`−`1 are assigned to 1-machines in OPT. Because these 1-machines
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have two jobs in OPT, the sizes of q∗i (i = `0 + 1, . . . , `0 + `− `1) are no bigger than
2− pn. Table 3.11 illustrates the job allocation on 1-machines up to this point.
M1 M2 · · · M`1 M`1+1 M`1+2 · · · M`
q∗`0+1 q
∗
`0+2
· · · q∗`0+`−`1p∗1 p∗2 · · · p∗`1 · · ·
Table 3.11: Job allocation on 1-machines in LPT*
Among all the jobs that are assigned to 1-machines in OPT, there are still `−2`0+`1
left to be assigned. Assume that among these `− 2`0 + `1 jobs, N1 are assigned to
1˜-machines, and the other `−2`0 + `1−N1 jobs, marked as q1, . . . , q`−2`0+`1−N1 , are
assigned to 1-machines. Finally, LPT* still needs to assign another 2`0 − 2`1 +N1
jobs to 1-machines and these jobs can only come from p∗i . Mark these jobs as
p1, . . . , p2`0−2`1+N1 .
To sum up, the total jobs that are assigned to 1-machines in LPT* are: p∗1, . . . , p∗`1 ,
q∗`0+1, . . . , q
∗
`0+`−`1 , q1, . . . , q`−2`0+`1−N1 , and p1, . . . , p2`0−2`1+N1 . Therefore, we de-
rive
∑
ti=1
(W ∗i −Wi) =
`0∑
i=1
q∗i +
`0+`−`1∑
i=`0+1
q∗i +
2`−`0∑
i=`0+`−`1+1
q∗i
−
 `1∑
i=1
p∗i +
`0+`−`1∑
i=`0+1
q∗i +
`−2`0+`1−N1∑
i=1
qi +
2`0−2`1+N1∑
i=1
pi
 .
If a job is assigned to a 1-machine in both OPT and LPT*, then it will be canceled
out in the above equation. We apply the same technique by considering items that
will not be canceled out, matching them into subsets, and finding the upper bound
for each subset.
First allow `0 ≥ `1, then `0 + ` − `1 > `. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , `1}, q∗i < 2 and
p∗i > θ − pn, and therefore,
q∗i − p∗i < 2− θ + pn.
For each i ∈ {`0+`−`1+1, . . . , 2`−`0}, we can always find i′ ∈ {`0+1, . . . , `−`0+`1}
such that q∗i and q
∗
i′ are assigned to the same 1-machine in OPT. Notice that q
∗
i′ for
i′ ∈ {`0 + 1, . . . , ` − `0 + `1} is assigned to 1-machines in LPT*, and q∗i′ + pj ≥ f ,
where f = max{2pn, θ − pn}. If q∗i is assigned to a 1-machine in LPT*, then it will
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be canceled out in calculating the difference between
∑
ti=1
W ∗i and
∑
ti=1
Wi. If q
∗
i
is assigned to a 1˜-machine, then
(q∗i′ + q
∗
i )− (q∗i′ + pj) < 2− f.
Finally for each i ∈ {`1 + 1, . . . , `0}, and j, j′ ∈ {1, . . . , 2`0 − 2`1 +N1}, we have
q∗i − pj − pj′ < 2− 2pn.
Accordingly,∑
ti=1
(W ∗i −Wi) <`1(2− θ + pn) + (`0 − `1)(2− 2pn) +N1(2− f)
=`1(3pn − θ) + `0(2− 2pn) +N1(2− f) = UB.
Notice that 0 ≤ `1 ≤ `0. If pn > θ3 , `1 should take its maximum possible value `0 in
order to maximize UB; while if pn ≤ θ3 , we shall let `1 to take its minimum possible
value 0 for the same purpose. The former case can be merged to the subsequent
discussion for `1 ≥ `0; the latter case, i.e., `1 = 0, has already been considered. On
the other hand, since 2 − 2pn ≥ 2 − f > 0, we shall allow `0 to attain its biggest
possible value, which is
∑
ti>1
(ti − 1).
Now assume that `1 ≥ `0, then `0 + `− `1 ≤ `. for each i ∈ {1, . . . , `0}, q∗i < 2 and
p∗i > θ − pn, and therefore,
q∗i − p∗i < 2− θ + pn.
Among the N1 jobs assigned to 1˜-machines after p
∗
1, assume that there are N2 pairs
of jobs being assigned to the same machine in OPT. Denote by q′i and q
′
i′ such a
pair of jobs. Notice that q∗`0+1, . . . , q
∗
`0+`−`1 are assigned to 1-machines; therefore we
have N2 ≤ `1 − `0. For q′i and q′i′ , we have
q′i + q
′
i′ − p∗j < 2− θ + pn.
Among the remaining N1 − 2N2 jobs, take the smallest 2`0 − 2`1 + N1, denoted
by q′′1 , . . . , q′′2`0−2`1+N1 . For each q
′′
i , we can find a corresponding job from q
∗
i′ (i
′ =
`0 + 1, . . . , `0 + ` − `1), such that q′′i and q∗i′ are assigned to the same machine in
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OPT. Therefore, we derive
(q∗i′ + q
′′
i )− (q∗i′ + pj) < 2− f.
For the remaining 2`1 − 2`0 − 2N2 jobs, denoted by q′′′i , we have
q′′′i + q
′′′
i′ − p∗j < 2− θ + pn.
Accordingly,∑
ti=1
(W ∗i −Wi) <`0(2− θ + pn) +N2(2− θ + pn)
+ (2`0 − 2`1 +N1)(2− f) + (`1 − `0 −N2)(2− θ + pn)
=`0(4− 2f) + `1(pn + 2f − θ − 2) +N1(2− f) = UB.
Because UB is independent to N2, for simplicity, we let N2 = 0. Since 2− f > 0, to
derive the upper bound, we shall allow `0 and N1 to attain their maximum values.
Finally, we shall let `1 = 0 when pn+2f−θ−2 ≤ 0, and let `1 to attain its maximum
value ` when pn + 2f − θ − 2 > 0. Notice that the former case has already been
discussed.
In the best case, each 1-machine Mi receives exactly one job in LPT*, and as
argued before, if this job is also assigned to some 1-machine Mi′ in OPT, then W
∗
i′
and Wi will cancel out each other without impact on UB. Accordingly, the best
case requires that q∗1 ≥ · · · ≥ q∗`0 ≥ p∗1 ≥ · · · ≥ p∗`1 ≥ θ − pn. In other words, all the
jobs assigned to 1-machines in LPT* are assigned to 1˜-machines in OPT.
For each ti ≥ 2, the number of 1-machines restricted by Mi is at most 2tiθ−pn . The
amount of workload can be compensated by each 1-machine is at most 2 − θ + pn.
Thus, the total workload compensation by 1-machines from Mi is at most
UBi =
2ti
θ − pn · (2− θ + pn).
However, the minimum workload compensation required by Mi is
Wi −W ∗i > θti − pn − 2ti = LBi.
Notice that pn + 2f − θ − 2 > 0 requires pn > 2+θ5 = 0.96. Thus, for ti ≥ 2, θ > 2.8
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and 0.96 < pn < 1, we have
LBi −UBi =θti − pn − 2ti − 2ti
θ − pn · (2− θ + pn)
=
(θ2 − pnθ − 4)ti − pnθ + p2n
θ − pn
≥2θ
2 − 3θpn + p2n − 8
θ − pn > 0.
Apparently, the maximum workload can be compensated by the givers is not enough
to cover the minimum workload required by the takers, i.e., LB > UB.
3.4.5 β = 1
When β = 1, both 1-machines and 2-machines can be givers. We have shown, for
β = 0, the minimum workload required by the takers cannot be compensated by
the maximum workload given by the givers in the counter-example I∗. For β = 1,
we show that the total amount of workload which can be compensated by the givers
will not increase as a result of the additional givers.
For β = 1 and θ ≥ 2.8, we derive 1.6 < pn < 4 from (3.22). If pn ≥ 2, then
W ∗i = 0, ∀ Mi ∈ S1, due to T ∗max = 1. Consequently, the 2-machines are the only
givers when pn ≥ 2.
For 1.6 < pn < 2, assume that pn = 1.6 + λ (0 < λ < 0.4). For ti = 1,
Wi ≥ pn = 1.6 + λ, and therefore
W ∗i −Wi < 2− pn = 0.4− λ, ∀ Mi ∈ S1.
For ti = 2, Wi ≥ 2θ − pn, and therefore
W ∗i −Wi < 4− 2θ + pn < λ, ∀ Mi ∈ S2.
The workload that can be compensated by a 1-machine is at most 0.4−λ, while the
workload that can be compensated by a 2-machine is at most λ. Denote by `1 and
`2 the total number of 1-machines and 2-machines. Thus∑
ti∈{1,2}
(W ∗i −Wi) <`1(0.4− λ) + `2λ = λ(`2 − `1) + 0.4`1 = UB.
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If `2 ≥ `1, then UB is maximized when λ → 0.4, however, this will lead to
W ∗i − Wi → 0 for all Mi ∈ S1. In other words, 2-machines are the only givers.
In addition, for λ → 0.4, pn → 2, and 2pn → 4, which implies that a giver 2-
machine must receive one job only in LPT*. Thus, this situation can be merged
with the case pn ≥ 2. Assume that all the 1-machines in instance I are deadwood,
i.e., all the 1-machines are assigned with the same amount of workload in both OPT
and LPT*. Then these 1-machines can be removed without influencing the work-
load assignment on the rest of the machines. Thus, instance I becomes exactly the
same as β = 0, except that all the job sizes and machine speeds are doubled. We
have shown that for such an instance, the total workload assigned in LPT* exceeds
that in OPT. Now assume that some of the 1-machines in I are takers, i.e., they
are assigned with more workload in LPT* than in OPT. With no additional givers
compensating the extra workload, the total workload required in LPT* will only
increase.
If `2 < `1, then UB is maximized when λ → 0, and this will lead to W ∗i −Wi → 0
for all Mi ∈ S2. In other words, 1-machines are the only givers, and the instance
becomes the same as for β = 0. As a result, it is safe to conclude that LB > UB for
β = 1.
We have shown the contradiction of LB > UB for both β = 0 and β = 1 in
the minimum counter example I∗. The contradiction implies that such I∗ does not
exist, and therefore we conclude θ < 2.8.
3.5 Conclusion
The major contributions of this chapter are two-fold: Firstly, we show that any
approximation algorithm for the makespan minimization problem can be directly
applied to the deviation minimization problem, resulting in an approximation al-
gorithm that can be as good as 2-approximate, depending on its performance on
the original problem. Secondly, we provide an improved analysis on the worst-case
performance of approximation algorithm LPT*. As a result, we reduce the current
bound of LPT* from 3 to 2.8, which in combination with Theorem 3.3 leads to an
efficient 2.8-approximation algorithm for the deviation minimization problem. The
theorem further implies that when designing a truthful mechanism for the devia-
tion minimization problem, one only needs to consider its performance from one
direction (i.e., minimization of the makespan) as long as the approximation ratio is
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above 2, even though the actual problem is concerned with both directions. The
other direction (i.e., maximization of the cover) starts to play a binding role only
after the algorithm has obtained a tight control over the makespan.
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Chapter 4
Exact truthful mechanism for
the deviation minimization
problem
In the previous chapter we discussed the performance of some approximation algo-
rithms on the deviation minimization objective function. In this chapter, we explore
the nature of this new objective function with the aim of achieving a polynomial-time
approximation scheme (PTAS).
4.1 Monotonicity of the deviation objective function
The makespan minimization and cover maximization problems can be both truth-
fully implemented with an exact algorithm. This property plays a key role in the
design of mechanisms with good levels of performance (Archer and Tardos, 2001;
Aulette et al., 2004). The success of the unified approach (Epstein et al., 2013),
which provides PTASs for a wide class of uniform machine scheduling problems
including the makespan minimization and the cover maximization problems, also
relies on the monotone nature of the objective functions.
Although the new objective seems to be a simple combination of the makespan
and the cover problems, it fails to inherit their monotone nature. This is because
for the makespan and cover problems, the optimal values are measured from a fixed
reference point of time 0. As a result, when changing the speed of an arbitrary
machine, the optimal values will only change if the completion time of the changing
machine reaches a point that deteriorates the current optimal value. By comparison,
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the deviation function uses T0 as a reference, the value of which is computed as the
sum of all the job sizes divided by the sum of all the machine speeds. When speeds
change, T0 will also change. Consequently, the change of the optimal value may
be caused purely by the change of T0, rather than the machines that change their
speeds.
Theorem 4.1. The deviation minimization problem cannot be truthfully imple-
mented with an exact algorithm.
Proof. When there are multiple optimal solutions, an exact algorithm must specify
a rule in order to output a unique solution. Accordingly, different exact algorithms
may yield different results for the same instance. However, if there is only one op-
timal solution, then any exact algorithm will end up with the same solution. As a
result, our proof is developed by showing that there exists a counter example with
exactly one optimal solution both before and after reducing the speed of an arbitrary
machine, and the workload on that machine under the optimal solution increases as
a result of the reduction in speed.
Consider an instance of 5 machines and 9 jobs, with machine speeds (13, 18, 21, 23, 26)
sorted in non-decreasing order and jobs sizes (122, 120, 87, 82, 77, 38, 21, 21, 20) sorted
in non-increasing order. MATLAB is used to enumerate all 59 = 1, 953, 125 feasible
allocations, and among them a unique allocation outputs the optimal value for the
deviation minimization objective. The job allocation and machine workload for this
optimal solution are summarized below.
Machines
Allocation
s1 = 13 s2 = 18 s3 = 21 s4 = 23 s5 = 26
p1 = 122
√
p2 = 120
√
p3 = 87
√
p4 = 82
√
Jobs p5 = 77
√
p6 = 38
√
p7 = 21
√
p8 = 21
√
p9 = 20
√
Workload 77 102 122 129 158
Table 4.1: Optimal allocation with the original speeds
Next we reduce s2 to 17.5 and resolve the maximum deviation of each feasible al-
location based on the reduced speed. It turns out that the maximum deviation is
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minimized with one unique allocation, with job assignment and workload shown as
follows.
Machines
Allocation
s1 = 13 s2 = 17.5 s3 = 21 s4 = 23 s5 = 26
p1 = 122
√
p2 = 120
√
p3 = 87
√
p4 = 82
√
Jobs p5 = 77
√
p6 = 38
√
p7 = 21
√
p8 = 21
√
p9 = 20
√
Workload 77 103 122 140 146
Table 4.2: Optimal allocation with reduced speed of M2
For this specific instance, the optimal solution is unique both before and after re-
ducing s2. Consequently, any exact algorithm will yield the same result, i.e., M2
receives a total workload of 102 when its reporting speed is 18, while it receives
a total workload of 103 after its reporting speed reduces to 17.5. Apparently, the
workload on M2 increases due to a reduced reporting speed under any optimal al-
gorithm. This completes our proof. 
In the above example, before speed reduction, the bottleneck machine in the opti-
mal solution is M5 – the one with the maximum completion time. After the speed
reduction, if the optimal solution remains unchanged, then the bottleneck machine
will become M4 – the one with the minimum completion time. It is interesting to
note that the completion times on both M4 and M5 remain the same. However the
bottleneck machine changes from M5 to M4. This is because, after speed reduction,
the average completion time T0 increases and becomes closer to Tmax. If there exists
another schedule which improves the optimal value, then the workload on M4 in
the new optimal solution must increase. The workload of M2 – the machine that
changes its speed, however, has no direct influence on the optimal value. Conse-
quently, we are unable to decide whether it will increase or decrease. This is the
underlying reason that prevents us from generating an exact truthful algorithm for
the deviation minimization problem.
Although the non-existence of an exact truthful algorithm is conclusive, according
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to our computational experiment, the counter example used in the proof only holds
under some strict conditions. As a result, it is reasonable to check the conditions
for such instances to exist.
4.2 Possible outcomes from reducing sk
According to Archer and Tardos (2001, see Theorem 2.1), it is sufficient to prove a
mechanism is truthful if we show that reducing the speed of an arbitrary machine,
the workload assigned to it will not increase. In this section, we consider all possible
changes of its workload when reducing the speed of an arbitary machine Mk. Define
two sets of speeds S and S′ as follows. Let Mk be an arbitrary chosen machine.
For every i 6= k the speed of Mi is si in both sets, and the speed of Mk is sk and
s′k respectively, such that sk > s
′
k. Consider two instances I and I
′ with all else
equal, except for the fact that the machine speeds in I are defined by S while the
machine speeds in I ′ are defined by S′. Let Π∗S and Π
∗
S′ denote the sets of optimal
solutions for I and I ′, respectively, under the deviation minimization objective. As
sk decreases to s
′
k, the average completion time increases from T0 to T
′
0; consequently
we define T ′0 = T0 + δ for some δ > 0. Let pi ∈ Π∗S and pi′ ∈ Π∗S′ . Denote by ∆
the optimal deviation for I, i.e., dev∗(I) = dev(pi, S) = ∆. Notice that pi is still a
feasible (not necessarily optimal) solution for I ′, and so is pi′ for I; accordingly there
are four combinations of allocations and speed sets:
– Allocation pi under the original speed set S, denoted by (pi, S);
– Allocation pi under the reduced speed set S′, denoted by (pi, S′);
– Allocation pi′ under the original speed set S, denoted by (pi′, S);
– Allocation pi′ under the reduced speed set S′, denoted by (pi′, S′).
We subsequently examine various possibilities when reducing the speed of an arbi-
trary machine.
Lemma 4.2. Arbitrarily choose pi from Π∗S. If dev(pi, S
′) = Tmax(pi, S′) − T ′0, then
Wk(pi) ≥ Wk(pi′) for all pi′ ∈ Π∗S′, unless pi ∈ Π∗S′ and Tmax(pi, S) = Tmax(pi, S′) =
T0 + ∆.
Proof. Since Π∗S′ represents the set of optimal solutions for instance I
′, for all pi′ ∈
Π∗S′ , we have dev(pi
′, S′) ≤ dev(pi, S′). Together with dev(pi′, S′) ≥ Tmax(pi′, S′)− T ′0
and dev(pi, S′) = Tmax(pi, S′)− T ′0, this implies that
Tmax(pi
′, S′) ≤ Tmax(pi, S′). (4.1)
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In addition, since only Mk reduces its speed from sk to s
′
k, Tmax(pi, S) ≤ Tmax(pi, S′)
must hold.
1. If Tmax(pi, S
′) > Tmax(pi, S), then
Tmax(pi, S
′) = Tk(pi, S′).
Together with (4.1), we derive Tk(pi, S
′) = Tmax(pi, S′) ≥ Tmax(pi′, S′) ≥
Tk(pi
′, S′). Thus, Wk(pi) ≥Wk(pi′) is derived directly from Tk(pi, S′) ≥ Tk(pi′, S′).
2. Subsequently, we assume that Tmax(pi, S
′) = Tmax(pi, S).
(a) If Tmax(pi, S
′) = Tmax(pi, S) < T0 + ∆, then together with (4.1), we have
Tmax(pi
′, S) ≤ Tmax(pi′, S′) ≤ Tmax(pi, S′) < T0 + ∆. (4.2)
In order for pi ∈ Π∗S , it requires dev(pi′, S) ≥ dev(pi, S) = ∆, which
together with (4.2) implies the following:
Tmin(pi
′, S) ≤ T0 −∆. (4.3)
However, since T ′0 > T0 and Tmax(pi, S′) = Tmax(pi, S), we derive dev(pi, S) ≥
Tmax(pi, S)− T0 > Tmax(pi, S′)− T ′0 = dev(pi, S′). This implies that
Tmin(pi
′, S′) > T0 −∆, (4.4)
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because T ′0−Tmin(pi′, S′) ≤ dev(pi′, S′) ≤ dev(pi, S′) = Tmax(pi, S′)−T ′0 <
T0 + ∆− T ′0 = ∆− δ. The combination of (4.3) and (4.4) suggests that
Tmin(pi
′, S′) > Tmin(pi′, S).
Therefore, it can only be the case that Tk(pi
′, S) = Tmin(pi′, S). Together
with (4.3), we derive Tk(pi
′, S) ≤ T0 − ∆ ≤ Tmin(pi, S) ≤ Tk(pi, S); thus
Wk(pi) ≥Wk(pi′) is again straightforward.
(b) If Tmax(pi, S
′) = Tmax(pi, S) = T0+∆, then we only consider pi 6∈ Π∗S′ since
pi ∈ Π∗S′ is excluded from our statement. If pi 6∈ Π∗S′ , then dev(pi′, S′) <
dev(pi, S′), which implies that
Tmax(pi
′, S) ≤ Tmax(pi′, S′) < Tmax(pi, S′) = Tmax(pi, S).
However, due to pi ∈ Π∗S , from dev(pi′, S) ≥ dev(pi, S) = ∆ and Tmax(pi′, S) <
T0 + ∆, we derive
Tmin(pi
′, S) ≤ T0 −∆.
On the other hand, the fact that dev(pi′, S′) < dev(pi, S′) = Tmax(pi, S′)−
T ′0 = ∆− δ requires
Tmin(pi
′, S′) > T ′0 − (∆− δ) = T0 −∆ + 2δ > Tmin(pi′, S).
Accordingly, Tk(pi
′, S) = Tmin(pi′, S) ≤ T0−∆ ≤ Tk(pi, S), from which we
derive Wk(pi) ≥Wk(pi′).

According to Lemma 4.2, if an optimal solution pi is chosen from Π∗S such that
after reducing the speed of an arbitrary machine Mk, Tmax(pi, S
′) becomes the bot-
tleneck, then one can choose any allocation from Π∗S′ and the result is monotone.
The only exception is when Tmax(pi, S) = Tmax(pi, S
′) = T0 + ∆ and pi ∈ Π∗S′ . Notice
that an exceptional case requests pi ∈ Π∗S′ . Thus, if an exact algorithm uniquely
chooses pi from both Π∗S and Π
∗
S′ , then we can achieve at least Wk(pi) = Wk(pi
′).
The result is still monotone.
Next, we consider the case where the bottleneck for (pi, S′) is Tmin(pi, S′).
Lemma 4.3. Arbitrarily choose pi from Π∗S. If dev(pi, S
′) = T ′0 − Tmin(pi, S′) and
pi 6∈ Π∗S′, then ∀ pi′ ∈ Π∗S′, either Wk(pi) ≥ Wk(pi′) or T0 + ∆ ≤ Tmax(pi′, S′) <
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T0 + ∆ + 2δ.
Proof. We first assume that dev(pi′, S′) < ∆−δ, from which we derive Tmax(pi′, S′) ≤
T ′0 + dev(pi′, S′) < T ′0 + ∆− δ = T0 + ∆, which in turn implies that
Tmax(pi
′, S) < T0 + ∆. (4.5)
Since dev(pi′, S) ≥ dev(pi, S) = ∆, together with (4.5), we derive Tmin(pi′, S) ≤
T0−∆. However, due to pi 6∈ Π∗S′ , we require dev(pi, S′) > dev(pi′, S′) for all pi′ ∈ Π∗S′ .
Together with dev(pi, S′) = T ′0 − Tmin(pi, S′) and dev(pi′, S′) ≥ T ′0 − Tmin(pi′, S′), we
derive
Tmin(pi
′, S′) > Tmin(pi, S′) ≥ Tmin(pi, S) ≥ T0 −∆.
Since onlyMk reduces its speed in set S
′, it is easy to derive Tk(pi′, S) = Tmin(pi′, S) <
Tmin(pi, S) ≤ Tk(pi, S), and therefore, Wk(pi) ≥Wk(pi′).
Next we assume that dev(pi′, S′) ≥ ∆ − δ. Then, at least one of the following
inequalities is true for pi 6∈ Π∗S′ :
Tmax(pi, S
′) > T ′0 + dev(pi
′, S′) ≥ Tmax(pi′, S′); (4.6)
Tmin(pi, S
′) < T ′0 − dev(pi′, S′) ≤ Tmin(pi′, S′). (4.7)
• If (4.6) is true, then Tmax(pi, S′) > T ′0 + dev(pi′, S′) ≥ T ′0 + ∆− δ = T0 + ∆ ≥
Tmax(pi, S), which implies that Tk(pi, S
′) = Tmax(pi, S′). Thus Tk(pi, S′) =
Tmax(pi, S
′) ≥ Tmax(pi′, S′) ≥ Tk(pi′, S′), and therefore, Wk(pi) ≥Wk(pi′).
• If (4.7) is true, then first assume that Tmax(pi′, S′) < T0 + ∆, which im-
plies (4.5), and Wk(pi) ≥ Wk(pi′) can be derived with the same logic as for
dev(pi′, S′) < ∆− δ. Otherwise, we have Tmax(pi′, S′) ≥ T0 + ∆. Finally, since
dev(pi, S′) = T ′0 − Tmin(pi, S′) ≤ T ′0 − T0 + ∆ = ∆ + δ, we derive dev(pi′, S′) <
dev(pi, S′) ≤ ∆+δ, and therefore, Tmax(pi′, S′) ≤ T ′0+dev(pi′, S′) < T0+∆+2δ.
This completes our proof.

For an arbitrary pi, either dev(pi, S′) = Tmax(pi, S′) − T ′0 or dev(pi, S′) = T ′0 −
Tmin(pi, S
′). Therefore, the combination of Lemma 4.2 and 4.3 implies that mono-
tonicity can be achieved with any exact algorithm in the deviation minimization
problem unless an instance has the following properties.
Definition 4.1. For a pair of instances I and I ′, if the outputs from any exact
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algorithm A satisfy WAk (I) ≥WAk (I ′), then we say truthfulness is achievable for free
for instance I.
Proposition 4.4. Truthfulness is not free to achieve for I under the deviation
minimization objective if I has one of the following properties:
Property 1. pi ∈ Π∗S′, and either (a) or (b) holds true:
(a) dev(pi, S′) = T ′0 − Tmin(pi, S′);
(b) dev(pi, S′) = Tmax(pi, S′)−T ′0 and Tmax(pi, S) = Tmax(pi, S′) = T0 +
∆.
Property 2. pi 6∈ Π∗S′ and T0 + ∆ ≤ Tmax(pi′, S′) < T0 + ∆ + 2δ.
4.3 An exact algorithm with improved performance on
truthfulness
Theorem 4.1 summarizes a negative result of designing an exact algorithm that
is always truthfully implementable. However, we have also shown that for many
instances, monotonicity can be achieved for free. We propose an algorithm that
guarantees truthfulness for a high proportion among instances where truthfulness is
not achievable for free.
4.3.1 An exact truthful algorithm for the makespan problem
In this section, we explain how an exact truthful algorithm works for the makespan
problems and why it fails in the case of our new objective function.
Consider a makespan minimization problem with a set of speeds S. Assume without
loss of generality that there are ` optimal solutions, denoted by Π = {pi1, . . . , pi`},
and for arbitrary Mk, we have Wk(pi1) ≥Wk(pi2) ≥ · · · ≥Wk(pi`). Partition Π into `′
subsets in such a way that the schedules in the same subset have the same workload
on Mk. In mathematical terms, Π =
⋃`′
i=1 Πi, where Πi = {pii|Wk(pii) = ci} and
c1 > c2 > · · · > c`′ .
Reduce the speed of Mk by ε while keeping the speeds of other machines un-
changed. Starting with ε = 0, we gradually increase the value of ε. For any feasible
schedule, the only feature that will change during this process is the completion
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time of Mk. The entire process can be split into two periods that appear alter-
natively. In the first period, the optimal solution set is Π as long as ∀ pii ∈ Π1,
Tk(pii) = Wk(pii)/(sk − ε) ≤ Tmax. The optimal solution set will become Π \ Π1 if
ε keeps increasing to the point that Wk(pij)/(sk − ε) ≤ Tmax < Wk(pii)/(sk − ε),
∀ i ∈ Π1 and ∀ j ∈ Π2. Similarly, as we keep increasing ε, the optimal solution
set will become Π \ (Π1 ∪ Π2), Π \ (Π1 ∪ Π2 ∪ Π3), and so on, until the optimal
solution set becomes Π`′ . In the second period, speed sk reduces to the extend that
the optimal solution set becomes a complete different set Π′, where Π′ ∩Π = ∅.
A few exact algorithms can be truthfully implemented for the makespan minimiza-
tion problem. One which is widely used in the literature sorts the workload vector of
each optimal solution in a non-decreasing order, and chooses the one whose workload
vector is the lexicographically minimum among all the optimal solutions (Archer and
Tardos, 2001). For simplicity, we name this algorithm Lexicographically Minimum
(LM).
In the first period, each time a subset is excluded from the optimal set, it is the one
that assigns the greatest workload to Mk. Thus, as long as an algorithm selects a
unique solution based on the same standard which is independent of the machine
speeds, the algorithm is truthfully implementable.
As for the second period, truthfulness can be achieved for free. This is because
each solution in Π′ assigns at most c`′ amount of workload to Mk. The success of
LM relies on the fact that the only factor that deteriorates the optimal value is given
by the completion time of Mk. As discussed previously, this property is not found
in the deviation minimization objective.
4.3.2 A new selection rule
The exceptional instances summarized in Proposition 4.4 fall into two types. The
first type only contains instances for which no exact algorithm can yield a truthful
outcome. Some instances with Property 2, like the one given at the beginning of
this chapter, fall into this group. The second type contains those instances for which
at least one exact algorithm can provide a truthful result. Some of the instances
with Property 2 and all the instances with Property 1 fall into this group. For such
instances, applying LM may lead to monotonicity. However, the performance of LM
is completely random. In this section, we aim to find an algorithm which guarantees
truthfulness for most, if not all, instances that belong to the second type.
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Claim 4.1. Any set of feasible allocations Π can be divided into two mutually ex-
clusive and collectively exhaustive subsets Πmin and Πmax, where
• Πmin = {pi|Tmax + Tmin < 2T0};
• Πmax = {pi|Tmax + Tmin ≥ 2T0}.
Tie breaking rule (TBR)
Let Π∗ be the entire set of optimal solutions for instance I and
|Π∗| > 1. A tie among the optimal solutions is broken by the following
steps.
Step 1. Classify the elements in Π∗ so that Π∗ = Πmin ∪Πmax.
Step 2. If Πmin 6= ∅, sort all the elements in Πmin in non-increasing
order based on the completion time of each machine. Choose
the one that is lexicographically minimum as the final solution.
Step 3. Otherwise, sort all the elements in Πmax in non-decreasing
order based on the completion time of each machine. Choose
the one that is lexicographically maximum as the final solution.
Lemma 4.5. TBR is a truthful implementation for the deviation minimization
problem if pi ∈ Π∗S′, unless Tmax(pi, S) = Tmax(pi′, S) = Tmax(pi, S′) = Tmax(pi′, S′) =
T0 + ∆ and Tmin(pi, S) = Tmin(pi
′, S) = Tmin(pi, S′) = Tmin(pi′, S′).
Proof. Classify the elements in Π∗S and Π
∗
S′ , respectively, so that Π
∗
S = Π
min
S ∪ΠmaxS
and Π∗S′ = Π
min
S′ ∪ ΠmaxS′ . Let pi ∈ Π∗S and pi′ ∈ Π∗S′ be the solution chosen by TBR
for I and I ′ respectively. We prove that Wk(pi) ≥Wk(pi′).
According to Proposition 4.4, for pi ∈ Π∗S′ , monotonicity is achieved with any pi ∈ Π∗S ,
except when (a) is true or (b) is true. Therefore, we only need to consider the two
exceptional cases. Notice that if pi = pi′, then Wk(pi) = Wk(pi′); hence we make the
assumption of pi 6= pi′.
1. If dev(pi, S′) = T ′0 − Tmin(pi, S′), then according to pi ∈ Π∗S′ , we derive pi ∈
ΠminS′ , i.e., Π
min
S′ 6= ∅, which in turn implies that pi′ ∈ ΠminS′ . Sort pi and pi′ in
non-increasing order respectively, based on completion times computed under
speeds S′. As TBR chooses pi′ over pi, pi′ is lexicographically smaller than pi,
and therefore
Tmax(pi, S
′) ≥ Tmax(pi′, S′). (4.8)
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In addition, dev(pi, S′) = dev(pi′, S′) = T ′0 − Tmin(pi′, S′) implies that
Tmin(pi
′, S′) = Tmin(pi, S′). (4.9)
(a) If pi′ 6∈ Π∗S , then at least one of the following inequalities is true:
Tmax(pi
′, S) > T0 + ∆; (4.10)
Tmin(pi
′, S) < T0 −∆. (4.11)
• First let (4.10) be true. Together with (4.8), we derive
Tmax(pi, S
′) ≥ Tmax(pi′, S′) ≥ Tmax(pi′, S) > T0 + ∆ ≥ Tmax(pi, S),
which in turn implies that Tk(pi, S
′) = Tmax(pi, S′) ≥ Tmax(pi′, S′) ≥
Tk(pi
′, S′); thus, Wk(pi) ≥Wk(pi′) is straightforward.
• Next let (4.11) be true. Together with (4.9), we derive
Tmin(pi
′, S′) = Tmin(pi, S′) ≥ Tmin(pi, S) ≥ T0 −∆ > Tmin(pi′, S),
which in turn implies that Tk(pi
′, S) = Tmin(pi′, S). Thus Wk(pi) ≥
Wk(pi
′) is straightforward since Tk(pi′, S) < T0 −∆ ≤ Tk(pi, S).
(b) If pi′ ∈ Π∗S , then either pi′ ∈ ΠminS or pi′ ∈ ΠmaxS .
i. First assume that pi′ ∈ ΠminS , which implies that ΠminS 6= ∅, and
therefore pi ∈ ΠminS . Sort pi and pi′ respectively in non-increasing
order based on completion times calculated under speeds S. As TBR
chooses pi over pi′, pi is lexicographically smaller than pi′. In other
words, there exists h such that Th(pi, S) < Th(pi
′, S) and Ti(pi, S) =
Ti(pi
′, S), ∀ i < h. However, pi′ is lexicographically smaller than
pi under speeds S′. Since only Mk reduces its speed from sk to
s′k, this is only possible if Tk(pi, S
′) > Th(pi′, S′) > Th(pi, S′) and
Tk(pi
′, S′) < Tk(pi, S′). The latter implies that Wk(pi) ≥Wk(pi′).
ii. Next assume that pi′ ∈ ΠmaxS . Accordingly, Tmax(pi′, S) = T0 + ∆.
If pi ∈ ΠminS , then Tmax(pi, S) < T0 + ∆. However, according to (4.8),
Tmax(pi, S
′) ≥ Tmax(pi′, S′) ≥ T0 +∆. This implies that Tmax(pi, S′) =
Tk(pi, S
′) ≥ Tmax(pi′, S′) ≥ Tk(pi′, S′), and therefore Wk(pi) ≥Wk(pi′).
If pi ∈ ΠmaxS , then Tmax(pi, S) = Tmax(pi′, S) = T0 + ∆. Sorting pi
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and pi′ in non-decreasing order based on completion times calculated
under speeds S, pi is lexicographically bigger than pi′. In other words,
Tmin(pi
′, S) ≤ Tmin(pi, S).
• If Tmin(pi′, S) < Tmin(pi, S), together with (4.9), we derive
Tmin(pi
′, S) < Tmin(pi, S) ≤ Tmin(pi, S′) = Tmin(pi′, S′),
which in turn implies Tmin(pi
′, S) = Tk(pi′, S) < Tmin(pi, S) ≤
Tk(pi, S), and therefore Wk(pi) ≥Wk(pi′).
• For Tmin(pi′, S) = Tmin(pi, S), if
Tmin(pi
′, S) = Tmin(pi, S) < Tmin(pi′, S′) = Tmin(pi, S′),
then Tmin(pi
′, S) = Tk(pi′, S) and Tmin(pi, S) = Tk(pi, S). In other
words, Wk(pi) = Wk(pi
′).
• Finally, if Tmin(pi′, S) = Tmin(pi, S) = Tmin(pi′, S′) = Tmin(pi, S′),
since Tmax(pi, S) = Tmax(pi
′, S) = T0 + ∆, according to our state-
ment, we only consider Tmax(pi, S
′) > T0 + ∆, Tmax(pi′, S′) >
T0 + ∆, or both. On the other hand, the fact that TBR picks pi
′
over pi in ΠminS′ implies that Tmax(pi
′, S′) ≤ Tmax(pi, S′). Therefore,
it must be the case that Tmax(pi, S
′) ≥ Tmax(pi′, S′) ≥ Tmax(pi, S).
Therefore, Tmax(pi, S
′) = Tk(pi, S′) ≥ Tk(pi′, S′) =⇒ Wk(pi) ≥
Wk(pi
′).
2. If dev(pi, S′) = Tmax(pi, S′)− T ′0 and Tmax(pi, S) = Tmax(pi, S′) = T0 + ∆, then
dev(pi, S) = Tmax(pi, S) − T0, i.e., pi ∈ ΠmaxS , which implies that ΠminS = ∅.
Additionally, since dev(pi′, S′) ≤ dev(pi, S′) = Tmax(pi, S′) − T ′0 = ∆ − δ, pi′
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satisfies
Tmin(pi
′, S′) ≥ T ′0 − (∆− δ) = T0 −∆ + 2δ. (4.12)
(a) If ΠminS′ 6= ∅, then
Tmax(pi
′, S) ≤ Tmax(pi′, S′) < Tmax(pi, S′) = T0 + ∆,
due to pi ∈ ΠmaxS′ and pi′ ∈ ΠminS′ . However, dev(pi′, S) ≥ dev(pi, S) = ∆,
therefore pi′ must satisfy Tmin(pi′, S) ≤ T0 − ∆. Together with (4.12),
we derive Tmin(pi
′, S′) > Tmin(pi′, S), which implies that Tmin(pi′, S) =
Tk(pi
′, S) < T0 −∆ ≤ Tk(pi, S); thus Wk(pi) ≥Wk(pi′) is straightforward.
(b) If ΠminS′ = ∅, then both pi and pi′ belong to ΠmaxS′ . Sorting pi and pi′ in
non-decreasing order based on completion times calculated under speeds
S′, pi′ is lexicographically bigger than pi.
• If pi′ 6∈ Π∗S , then it must be the case that Tmin(pi′, S) < T0 − ∆,
since Tmax(pi
′, S) ≤ T0 + ∆. Again, with (4.12), it implies that
Tmin(pi
′, S) = Tk(pi′, S) < T0 −∆ ≤ Tk(pi, S) and therefore Wk(pi) ≥
Wk(pi
′).
• If pi′ ∈ Π∗S , then both pi and pi′ are elements of ΠmaxS . We sort pi and
pi′ respectively in non-decreasing order based on completion times
calculated under speeds S, and pi is lexicographically bigger than
pi′. In other words, there exists h such that Th(pi, S) > Th(pi′, S)
and Tl(pi, S) = Tl(pi
′, S), ∀ l < h. Nevertheless, pi′ is lexicographi-
cally bigger than pi in ΠmaxS′ . Accordingly, it must be the case that
Tk(pi
′, S′) < Th(pi, S) and Tk(pi′, S) < Tk(pi, S). The latter implies
that Wk(pi) ≥Wk(pi′).
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As an immediate result of Lemma 4.5, we derive the following statement regard-
ing the truthfulness of TBR.
Proposition 4.6. TBR is truthfully implementable for the deviation minimization
problem, unless an instance satisfies one of the following conditions.
1. pi ∈ Π∗S′, Tmax(pi, S) = Tmax(pi′, S) = Tmax(pi, S′) = Tmax(pi′, S′) = T0 + ∆ and
Tmin(pi, S) = Tmin(pi
′, S) = Tmin(pi, S′) = Tmin(pi′, S′).
2. pi 6∈ Π∗S′ and T0 + ∆ < Tmax(pi′, S′) < T0 + ∆ + 2δ.
It is worth noticing that both conditions can be easily violated if the reporting speeds
increases/decreases by a relatively big amount. More specifically, rules can be made
so that each time Mk changes its speed, the amount it is allowed to change must
be no less than ε. If ε is too big, then the accuracy of the output will be sacrificed.
However, if ε is too small, then the above conditions may not be efficiently avoided.
To ensure TBR is truthfully implementable for any instances, a lower bound of ε can
be found by solving Wk(pi)sk−ε ≥ T0 +∆+2δ. However, in this inequality, δ is a function
of ε, and sk is some private information unavailable to the central authority. This
increases the difficulties in generating a concrete function for ε.
4.3.3 Combine TBR with the unified approach
The unified approach proposed by Epstein et al. (2013) can be modified to solve
the deviation minimization problem. The result is PTAS but not monotone.
Proposition 4.7. Assume that s1 ≤ s2 ≤ · · · ≤ sm. There exists an optimal
schedule pi for the deviation minimization problem which satisfies W1(pi) ≤W2(pi) ≤
· · · ≤Wm(pi).
Proof. Consider a schedule pi with maximum deviation ∆. A pair of machines Mi
and Mj is called reversed if 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m and Wi(pi) > Wj(pi). We show that
removing a consecutive reversed pair (that is, j = i+ 1) by swapping the workloads
assigned to them from any schedule pi does not increase the maximum deviation.
Let pi′ be the schedule resulting from swapping the two job sets of Mi and Mj . In
pi′, the completion time of Mi is bounded by
T0 −∆ ≤ Wj(pi)
sj
≤ Wi(pi
′)
si
=
Wj(pi)
si
<
Wi(pi)
si
≤ T0 + ∆,
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while the completion time of Mj is bounded by
T0 −∆ ≤ Wj(pi)
sj
≤ Wj(pi
′)
sj
=
Wi(pi)
sj
≤ Wi(pi)
si
≤ T0 + ∆.

Proposition 4.7 presents a desirable property which enables us to apply the uni-
fied approach to the deviation minimization problem. In their work A unified ap-
proach to truthful scheduling on related machines, Epstein et al. (2013) define a
highly structured schedule which can be found by constructing a directed graph via
dynamic programming. Moreover, they present the following theorem.
Theorem 4.8 (Epstein et al., 2013). Given a schedule pi such that W1(pi) ≤
W2(pi) ≤ · · · ≤ Wm(pi), there exists a structured schedule pi∗, such that for i =
1, 2, . . . ,m, we have
(1− 14ε) ·Wi(pi) ≤Wi(pi∗) ≤ (1 + 14ε) ·Wi(pi). (4.13)
According to Proposition 4.7. for any deviation minimization problem I, there exists
an optimal solution pi, such that W1(pi) ≤ W2(pi) ≤ · · · ≤ Wm(pi). Thus, we can
always find the corresponding structured schedule of pi, denoted by pi∗, via generating
the directed graph under the unified approach as if I was a makespan problem.
Since pi is an optimal solution, we have dev∗(I) = max{Tmax(pi)−T0, T0−Tmin(pi)}.
Moreover,
(1− 14ε) · Ti(pi) ≤ Ti(pi∗) ≤ (1 + 14ε) · Ti(pi), ∀ i
is derived from (4.13) based on Theorem 4.8. Therefore, we have
dev(pi∗) ≤ (1 + 14ε) · dev∗(I).
The structured schedule pi∗ can be found in the following way. First, generate the
directed layered graph under the unified approach. Then, replace the weights of
each vertex with devi, where i presents the corresponding machine in layer i. Each
optimal structured schedule corresponds to a path that minimizes the maximum
weight of a vertex along the path. When more than one structured schedule can be
found, the tie is broken by TBR.
The resulting algorithm is a PTAS with runtime O(n((14r+19)λ+8)), where r ≥ 5
and λ = dlog1+ε 2e, and monotonicity is determined by TBR.
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4.4 Computational experiment
To gauge the ability of TBR in providing good solutions in terms of monotonicity, a
computational experiment was conducted. The algorithms were coded in MATLAB
and implemented on a server with 3.4 GHz dual processor, 8 GB RAM memory,
and Windows 10 operating system. Due to the purpose of the experiment, the
complete enumeration of mn needs to be considered. On the one hand, to test the
performance of TBR, we are interested in the instances with more than one optimal
solution. If the number of jobs is close to or smaller than the number of machines,
then more often than not, such instances present only one optimal solution. This
is the case for instances with m = 6 and n = 8. On the other hand, to test for
monotonicity, we prefer instances with larger numbers of machines. This is because
monotonicity can often be achieved for free if an instance has three or even fewer
machines. As presented in Table 4.3, the largest instances that we can generate the
complete enumeration of without breaking the memory are m = 5, n = 9 and m = 4,
n = 11. Computational results from the two combinations show little difference. As
a result, we only present our results from running the experiments for m = 5 and
n = 9.
HHHHHHm
n
8 9 10 11 12
4 5.126s 10.562s 41.347s 174.088s
out of
memory
5 13.602s 67.656s
out of
memory
6 53.839s
out of
memory
Table 4.3: Impact of instance sizes on memory
Based on Proposition 4.7, the problem can be further sized down by only considering
the structured schedules. This efficiently reduces the number of schedules from
59 = 1, 953, 125 to around 104 for m = 5 and n = 9, and the resulting computation
time is reduced by around 30 times (from approx. 340s to 11s of CPU time). Uniform
distributions are employed to generate the job sizes and machine speeds. Varying
the ranges of these two variables shows little impact on the final results. In each
run, a random number between 1 and 5 is given to k, the index of the machine
that changes its speed. The amount of speed being reduced follows a continuous
uniform distribution between 0 and 4. Table 4.4 summarizes the main variables in
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MATLAB, and the way they are generated. Both code and data are available on
demand.
Variables Explanation Property Range
job sizes The size of each job. Discrete [1, 100]
machine speeds The speed of each machine. Discrete [1, 50]
k The index of machine that changes
its speed.
Discrete [1, 5]
reduce amount The amount of speed being re-
duced.
Continuous (0, 4]
Table 4.4: Data generation summary
The computational experiment consists of two parts. The first part compares the
performance of TBR and LM, in particular when monotonicity is not free to achieve.
The second part demonstrates the performance of TBR with rounding speeds.
4.4.1 TBR vs. LM
This section discusses the results of applying TBR to various instances and compares
them with the results of applying LM to the same instances. In order to measure per-
formance, we introduce notation nf , nT and nL to count the number of instances in
which (a) monotonicity is achieved for free, (b) monotonicity is achieved under TBR,
and (c) monotonicity is achieved under LM. We first initialize the values of nf , nT
and nL to zero. For each of the randomly generated instances, we obtain the optimal
solution set for the original speeds and the reduced speeds, respectively. If mono-
tonicity can be achieved effortless, that is minpi∈Π∗S{Wk(pi)} ≥ maxpi′∈Π∗S′{Wk(pi
′)},
then
nf := nf + 1; nT := nT + 1; nL := nL + 1.
Otherwise, we apply TBR and LM respectively. If the result of applying TBR is
monotone, i.e., W TBRk (pi) ≥ W TBRk (pi′), then nT := nT + 1. Likewise, if the result
of applying LM is monotone, i.e., WLMk (pi) ≥WLMk (pi′), then nL := nL + 1.
A total number of 5000 randomly generated instances were tested, and we derive
nf = 2854, nT = 4993, and nL = 4944. Not surprisingly, TBR provides an im-
proved performance (4993 out of 5000 instances, or 99.86%) in comparison to that
of LM (4944 out of 5000 instances, or 98.88%). Given that in more than half of the
instances (nf = 2854), monotonicity can be achieved with any exact algorithm, it
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is more appropriate to compare the following probabilities:
nT − nf
5000− nf = 99.67%;
nL − nf
5000− nf = 97.39%.
The new results indicate that when truthfulness is not achievable for free, TBR
provides truthful results with a probability of 99.67%, comparing to 97.39% by LM.
The improvement is much less significant than we expected due to an underesti-
mation of the performance of LM. Both candidates provide nearly 100% positive
results. However, as long as there exists a non-monotone instance, the algorithm is
not truthful. The computational results coincide with our theoretical results.
4.4.2 TBR with rounding speeds
This section is designed to test the performance of TBR when it is used in combina-
tion with rounding speeds. The original machine speeds and the reduced speeds in
the previous 5000 instances are both rounded down to the largest integer powers of 2.
The optimal solution sets are then derived based on the rounded speeds. We apply
TBR and LM respectively when monotonicity is not for free, count the number of
the three types of instances in the same way as described in the first experiment, and
denote them by nfr , nTr and n
L
r , respectively to distinguish from the previous results.
Denote by pi∗ and pi respectively the optimal solution under the deviation mini-
mization objective with the original speeds and the rounding speeds. Due to the
use of rounding speeds, the objective value under solution pi is no longer global
optima. We employ
a1 =
dev(pi) + T0
dev(pi∗) + T0
to measure the approximation ratio of TBR under rounding speeds.
Another guaranteed truthful algorithm is the exact algorithm for the makespan
problem with tie broken by LM. Based on Theorem 3.3, the alternative algorithm
provides 2-approximation for the deviation minimization problem. For each in-
stance, we obtain its optimal solution under the makespan minimization objective
with the original speeds, and denote the solution by pi′. We use
a2 =
dev(pi′) + T0
dev(pi∗) + T0
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to measure the approximation ratio of the alternative algorithm. If TBR yields
100% positive results when running with rounding speeds, we would like to further
compare the approximation ratios a1 and a2.
Figure 4.1 compares the histograms of a1 and a2. Both graphs are heavily skewed to
the left. However, the histogram of a2 has a long tail and a small peak after 1.5. By
comparison, the distribution of a1 mainly centers between 1 and 1.5. From the his-
tograms, we can conclude that by rounding the speeds to the powers of 2, we are able
to eliminate the exceptional instances where TBR fails to be monotone. Although
the output allocation is no longer optimal, it is a more accurate approximation to
the original problem than simply solving it as a makespan problem. A closer exam-
ination of individual instances also suggests that the current speed rounding rule
is quite relax. We conjecture that TBR can be converted into a truthful algorithm
under a tighter speed rounding rule.
Figure 4.1: Histograms
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4.5 Conclusion
If the new objective function inherits the monotone nature from the makespan and
the cover problems, then to design a truthful PTAS will be straightforward. Un-
fortunately, no exact algorithm can be truthfully implementable to the deviation
minimization problem. Having said that, there are only a few cases where when
an agent reports a reduced/increased speed, its workload may increase/decrease in-
stead. These cases have been characterized precisely in Proposition 4.4. To deal
with the exceptional instances, we propose TBR, which imposes much more strict
conditions for instances where truthfulness is not guaranteed. Based on our further
observation, those conditions no longer hold if minor changes in reporting speeds
are not allowed. Computational results also suggest a high potential for converting
TBR into a truthful algorithm with good approximation ratio when rounding speeds
are employed.
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Chapter 5
Tardiness minimization problem
In the previous chapters, fairness has been defined from the machines’ point of
view. This chapter, however, takes an alternative approach, and considers the issue
of fairness from the perspective of the jobs.
5.1 Background and motivation
Our model is inspired by observations from the home health care scheme, a ser-
vice that aims to provide clinical care that is usually available in hospitals with the
only difference that in this case it takes place at a patient’s home. In other words,
rather than having patients travel to the hospital, practitioners are sent to patients’
houses. As the service is provided outside the hospital with little control imposed,
practitioners may misreport the time they spend with a patient. On the other hand,
each patient receives an ideal cure time, and the aim of the hospital is to deliver the
service before this due date. Due to the limitations on the available resources, not
all patients’ requirements can be fulfilled in time. One of the objectives is therefore
to minimize the maximum delay among all the patients. To this end, it is essential
for the hospital to solicit the correct information from practitioners.
The above objective is also known as the maximum tardiness minimization problem.
One of the earliest studies of this type can be dated back to the 1950s. Jackson
(1955) considered the one-machine scheduling problem with the objective of mini-
mizing maximum lateness, a feature that is measured by the difference between job
completion time and job due date. The notion of tardiness, defined as the maximum
value between 0 and lateness, was originally proposed by Emmons (1969). It was
argued that tardiness is often a more reasonable substitute to lateness. Garey and
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Johnson (1979) proved that the maximum tardiness problem is NP-hard even with
a single machine. Tardiness related objectives have been considered under various
settings. Examples are given by: Potts and Van Wassenhove (1985), Alidaee and
Rosa (1997), and Biskup et al. (2008), who consider the total (weighted) tardiness
problem; Kayvanfar et al. (2014), and Balakrishnan et al. (1999), who combine
tardiness with earliness under the influence of just-in-time philosophy; and Yang et
al. (2004) and Kim et al. (2003), who consider tardiness under overtime costs and
setup times, respectively. Results on tardiness feature with single machine are rich,
although many of them are enumerative based (Baker, 1974; Hall et al., 1991). A
fair amount of research have been conducted for identical machines (Azizoglu and
Kirca, 1998) as well as for unrelated parallel machines (Kayvanfar et al., 2014).
However, the literature becomes quite scant when we combine the tardiness feature
with uniform machines. The study that seems to be the closest to this work was
carried out by Koulamas and Kyparisis (2000), who extend the earliest due date
(EDD) rule to scheduling problems with uniform machines in order to minimize
maximum lateness. The result only exceeds the optimal value by no more than
pmax, where pmax represents the maximum job length. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the maximum tardiness minimization objective has not been considered in the
field of mechanism designs with machine agents.
5.1.1 Model description
In the uniform machine scheduling model, we assume that each job Jj is associated to
a due date dj by which it is ideally completed. Let cj(pi) denote the completion time
of Jj under a feasible schedule pi. The lateness of Jj is defined by Lj(pi) = cj(pi)−dj ,
and tardj(pi) = max{0, cj(pi) − dj} defines its tardiness. The objective is then to
find a schedule pi that minimizes the maximum tardiness among all the jobs. In
mathematical terms,
min
pi
max
j
tardj(pi).
As our modifications do not change the game theoretical nature of the problem, for
this model the condition for a truthful algorithm follows Archer and Tardos (2001).
No assumptions have been made between a job’s due date and its size. There-
fore, these two features are treated as independent of each other. For an algorithm
to be truthful, its output workloads must be monotone with regard to the machine
speeds; while in order to optimize the tardiness objective, one only takes into ac-
count the due dates. Intuitively, a truthful algorithm will perform poorly on the
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tardiness objective.
Denote by tard∗ the optimal objective value of a maximum tardiness minimiza-
tion problem, and tardA the objective value derived from applying algorithm A.
The performance of A can be measured by
φA =
tardA
tard∗
.
However, tard∗ may equal zero for some instances. To avoid a zero denominator, we
adjust φA by adding a constant dmax = maxj{dj} to both the top and the bottom
as suggested by Lenstra (1976). The resulting approximation ratio becomes
φA =
tardA + dmax
tard∗ + dmax
.
5.1.2 Some general results
This section presents the results related to the monotone nature of the tardiness
objective and the link with the makespan problem. Since pj is independent of dj ,
the following conclusion is straightforward.
Proposition 5.1. The maximum tardiness minimization problem cannot be truth-
fully implemented with an exact algorithm.
Proof. According to Theorem 2.1, to prove this statement, we only need to show
the existence of an instance which has only one optimal solution both before and
after reducing the speed of an arbitrary machine, and the workload of that machine
increases due to its speed reduction.
M1 M2 cj tardj
J1
√
0.5 0
J2
√
1.8 0.4
J3
√
2 0.4
Table 5.1: Optimal solution with original speeds
Consider an instance with two machines of speeds s1 = 10, s2 = 7. We assign
three jobs of sizes p1 = 5, p2 = 13, p3 = 14, and the corresponding due dates
d1 = 1, d2 = 1.4, d3 = 1.6 to the machines in such a way that the maximum tardi-
ness among the jobs is minimized. In the optimal solution, the two jobs with smaller
sizes are assigned to M1 and the biggest job is assigned to M2. The optimal value
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is 0.4, as shown in Table 5.1.
We reduce the speed of M1 to 9 while all the other values remain the same. The
optimal solution for the new instance, presented in Table 5.2, is to assign J1 and J3
to M1 and J2 to M2. This gives us a maximum tardiness of
23
45 .
M1 M2 cj tardj
J1
√ 5
9 0
J2
√ 13
7
16
35
J3
√
219
23
45
Table 5.2: Optimal solution with reduced speeds
As the speed of the faster machine reduces from 10 to 9, the work assigned to it
increases from 18 to 19. 
As in the case of the deviation minimization problem, the maximum tardiness min-
imization objective is not truthful in nature. However, Proposition 5.2 enables us
to apply any existing truthful algorithm for the makespan problem to the tardiness
problem and the performance of the algorithm only deteriorates by 1.
Proposition 5.2. If algorithm A is an α-approximation algorithm for the makespan
minimization objective, then A is α + 1-approximate for the maximum tardiness
minimization problem.
Proof. Let piA denote the output from the application of algorithm A, while piT
and piM respectively define the schedule that optimizes the maximum tardiness,
and the one that optimizes the maximum makespan. Let Tmax and T
∗
max denote the
makespan of piA, and piM respectively. Since A is α-approximate for the makespan
problem, we have that Tmax ≤ αT ∗max. Finally, Mk and Mk′ respectively define the
bottleneck machines in piA and piT . Thus,
φA =
max{dmax, ck(piA)− dk + dmax}
max{dmax, ck′(piT )− dk′ + dmax} .
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First, we assume that dmax ≥ T ∗max, then
φA =
max{dmax, ck(piA)− dk + dmax}
max{dmax, ck′(piT )− dk′ + dmax}
≤ ck(pi
A)− dk + dmax
dmax
≤ αT
∗
max + dmax
dmax
≤ αdmax + dmax
dmax
= α+ 1.
The second inequality is due to ck(pi
A) ≤ Tmax ≤ αT ∗max and dk > 0.
Next, we assume that dmax < T
∗
max, then
ck′(pi
T )− dk′ + dmax ≥ T ∗max − dmax + dmax = T ∗max > dmax,
from which we derive
φA =
max{dmax, ck(piA)− dk + dmax}
max{dmax, ck′(piT )− dk′ + dmax}
≤ ck(pi
A)− dk + dmax
ck′(piT )− dk′ + dmax ≤
αT ∗max + dmax
T ∗max
<
αT ∗max + T ∗max
T ∗max
= α+ 1.

5.2 Two-stage LPT*
In this section, we aim to develop a heuristic for the tardiness minimization problem
that serves the following objectives: (a) speediness in allocating jobs (b) truthfulness
in soliciting private information concerning the different speeds and (c) efficiency in
achieving fairness among the jobs. Let us first consider a special condition relating
to job lengths and due dates. Specifically, it is assumed that for Jj and Jj′ , if pj > pj′
then dj ≥ dj′ . Under this assumption, LPT becomes equivalent to EDD, which sorts
jobs according to non-decreasing due dates, and assigns the next available job in
the sequence to the earliest finishing machine. It is known that the adjusted LPT is
a truthful algorithm for uniform machine scheduling problem, whereas EDD is an
efficient greedy algorithm for tardiness related objectives. Indeed, the performance
of LPT on the maximum tardiness minimization problem largely depends on the
due date range, i.e., dmax − dmin. As long as this range is relatively small, the job
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sequence in LPT will not differ too much from the job sequence in EDD. Based on
this observation, we propose a two-stage LPT* with the aim of buffering the impact
from a large due date range.
Lemma 5.3. Two-stage LPT* is a truthful algorithm.
Proof. In sub case i, the workload received by each machine is equal to the sum of
the workloads computed by a monotone algorithm (LPT*) running on two disjoint
sets of jobs. These two sets are uniquely determined by the case index i, and are
independent of the machine speeds. 
Two-stage LPT*
Input: a job sequence σ, and a speed vector S.
Step 1. Sort the job sequence so that d1 ≤ d2 ≤ · · · ≤ dn.
Step 2. In sub case i (i = 1), break σ into two partial sequences σ1 and
σ2 so that σ1 = {J1, . . . , Ji}, and σ2 = {Ji+1, . . . , Jn}.
Step 3. Run LPT* independently on σ1 and σ2. The final jobs on Mk
are the jobs assigned to Mk from both sequences.
Step 4. For each Mk, re-sort the jobs assigned to it according to
non-decreasing due dates.
Step 5. Compute the maximum tardiness based on the re-ordered job
positions and record the result as tard(i).
Step 6. i := i+ 1. Go to Step 2 until i := n.
Step 7. Output tardTL
∗
= min{tard(i)} and the corresponding job
positions as the final results.
Sub case n in two-stage LPT* outputs the same result as LPT*. In other words,
tardTL
∗ ≤ tard(n). This implies that two-stage LPT* performs at least as well as
LPT*. In Section 3.4 we have shown that LPT* is a 2.8-approximation algorithm
for the makespan minimization problem. Hence, according to Proposition 5.2, LPT*
is at most a 3.8-approximation for the maximum tardiness minimization problem.
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5.3 Computational tests
This section is designed to evaluate the performance of two-stage LPT*. The algo-
rithm is coded in MATLAB. The number of machines (m), and the number of jobs
(n) are set to be {3, 5, 10} and {10, 20, 50, 100} respectively. Both the job sizes and
the machine speeds are generated from a discrete uniform distribution between 1
and 100. The due dates follow U [(Tmax(1−α−β/2), Tmax(1−α+β/2)], a distribu-
tion suggested by Potts and Van Wassenhove (1985). Parameters α and β control
the average tardiness and the due date range. We fix α to be 0.5, and consider
both β = 0.2 and β = 0.8. Since makespan Tmax cannot be calculated directly, the
average completion time T0 is used as an approximation. A batch of 100 random
instances are created for each type of combination.
The Earliest Due Date (EDD) and Shortest Processing Time (SPT) are among
the earliest results for tardiness related objectives. Both algorithms undertake the
same procedures as LPT in job allocation, except that EDD orders jobs according
to non-decreasing due dates, and SPT orders jobs according to non-decreasing job
sizes. The two algorithms still play a fundamental role in designing many of the
heuristic procedures. A common belief is that a highly congested system indicates
the use of SPT, whereas EDD performs well when congestion is low. Since the opti-
mal solution for the maximum tardiness minimization problem is NP-complete, we
compare the results of two-stage LPT* with those obtained by implementing EDD
and SPT instead. The result of two-stage LPT* is also compared with the result of
LPT* to see how much improvement in the approximation ratio is obtained at the
expense of additional computational costs.
We used the criteria suggested by Alidaee and Rosa (1997) to compare the be-
haviours of the different algorithms.
(1) Percentage of Number of Best (PNoB): This refers to the percentage of the
number of times in which an algorithm provides a schedule which is at least as
good as the others.
(2) Average of the Ratio (Ratio): This refers to the average of the following ratio.
Ratio =
tardA − tard∗
tard∗
× 100,
where tard∗ denotes the best results achieved by implementing all the algorithms
that we would like to compare.
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(3) Maximum of Ratio (MAR): This is the maximum of the above Ratio.
(4) CPU: This is the total CPU time of running 100 random instances.
The main results are presented in Table 5.3. Our purpose is not to compare two-stage
LPT* with EDD or SPT, as the latter two algorithms are not truthful. Instead, we
aim to examine whether the improvement of two-stage LPT* in approximation ratio
is significant enough to justify its additional computations compared with LPT*.
Having said that, it is worthwhile noticing that with a small number of jobs (within
3 times the number of machines), two-stage LPT* outperforms all three other rules.
Additionally, with small size problems (n ≤ 20), the computation time in running
two-stage LPT* is negligible.
Performances of the algorithms in tight and loose due date range settings based
on the problem sizes are visualized in Figures 5.1-5.3. With the number of jobs in-
creasing by multiples of the number of machines, the advantages of two-stage LPT*
over LPT* become less obvious when the due date range is tight. Nevertheless,
two-stage LPT* manages to maintain its level of performance under a loose due
date range, while the performance of LPT* shows a clear deterioration as the due
date range increases.
As indicated by MAR, two-stage LPT* is very efficient in controlling bad cases
in comparison to LPT*. This advantage is highlighted in the case of loose due date
ranges. This is a clear evidence of an improved approximation ratio by applying
two-stage LPT* to the maximum deviation minimization problem. Finally, although
computation times increase significantly after n ≥ 50, the absolute running time for
a single instance is quite reasonable (max 9.74s CPU time for m = 10, n = 100).
5.4 Conclusion
As an extension of the notion of fairness, this chapter addressed the issue of fairness
from the perspective of the jobs. An application of this problem can be found in
home health care schemes. Due to the lack of link between the size of a job and
the due dates, the objective function is not monotone in nature. However, one is
still able to achieve a good approximation ratio with existing truthful algorithms for
the makespan problem. In particular, LPT* presents a 3.8-approximation for the
maximum tardiness minimization problem. To develop a more accurate algorithm
for the target objective, efforts were directed to combining the monotonicity feature
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of LPT* with EDD, a traditional algorithm which is designed to address tardiness
related problems. The resulting two-stage LPT* remains monotone and presents
much improved performance with regard to the computational results, particularly
in the case of small size problems and loose due date ranges.
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(a) Tight due date range β = 0.2 (b) Loose due date range β = 0.4
Figure 5.1: Ratio for different algorithms m = 3
(a) Tight due date range β = 0.2 (b) Loose due date range β = 0.4
Figure 5.2: Ratio for different algorithms m = 5
(a) Tight due date range β = 0.2 (b) Loose due date range β = 0.4
Figure 5.3: Ratio for different algorithms m = 10
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Chapter 6
Summary and concluding
remarks
We have proposed a new objective function that better reflects the concept of fairness
in the uniform machine scheduling setting. In the new objective, named deviation
minimization function, the completion times of machines are bounded from both
directions so that a more even distribution of jobs to machines can be achieved.
Unfortunately, lack of monotonicity in the nature of the objective jeopardized our
attempt to develop a truthful PTAS for the problem. On the other hand, the close
link between the deviation minimization and the makespan minimization problems
enables us to employ truthful algorithms designed for the latter directly to our
targeted problem and maintain good approximation ratios. In particular, we have
looked into a fast, previously known as 3-approximation algorithm – LPT*. Using
the approach of a minimum counter-example, we have established an improved up-
per bound of 2.8, and it is believed that, with the same approach, a tight bound of
the algorithm can be found.
Based on the fact that the optimal value under the deviation minimization func-
tion can be bounded by either the maximum or the minimum completion time, we
have developed a tie breaking rule (TBR) which selects a unique optimal solution
based on the bottleneck machine. The algorithm only fails the monotonicity test
on instances satisfying strict conditions. In addition, those conditions can be easily
violated, and thus the failure instances can be eliminated, if the central authority
imposes rounding rule on the speeds revealed by the machine agents. For instance,
our computational results suggest that TBR passes the monotonicity test with zero
failure when agents are requested to report their speeds in the form of 2 to the
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power. In fact, we conjecture that a much tighter rounding rule could serve the
same purpose, and it is clear that the tighter the rounding rule is, the smaller the
approximation ratio will become.
As an extension to the deviation minimization problem, we have also considered
the maximum tardiness minimization, a traditional objective that meets the needs
for fairness among jobs with due dates, under the game theoretical settings with
uniform machines. To tackle this problem, we have proposed two-stage LPT* which
efficiently balances the conflicts between the demand for monotone workload from
truthfulness against the demand for minimizing maximum tardiness from the ob-
jective function.
Our work raises the problem of designing truthful PTASs when the objective func-
tion itself is not monotone. To the best of our knowledge, studies on mechanism
design in machine scheduling have been limited to objective functions that are mono-
tone in nature, i.e., the exact algorithm for the objective function is truthfully imple-
mentable. A PTAS for these problems is usually generated by reducing the amount
of enumeration to be considered under the exact algorithm. However, the existing
approaches fail in the situations when the objective function is no longer monotone.
Another area that is worth further study is the application of different fairness
criteria in machine scheduling. In our work, fairness is considered in the max-min
form, and is limited to a single dimension, i.e., the completion time for either ma-
chines or jobs. But the notion is usually much more complex in reality. Therefore,
it is worthwhile to consider the issue of fairness based on other theories or to bring
the it into real contexts.
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